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DISCLOSING THE DANGER: STATE ATTORNEY ETHICS RULES MEET
CLIMATE CHANGE
Victor B. Flatt*
Abstract
This Article suggests a novel concept in climate change law and
attorney ethics law by proposing that many states’ attorney ethics laws
could be interpreted to require, or at least permit, attorneys to disclose
client activity relating to greenhouse gas emissions. Every state has some
form of ABA Model Rule 1.6(b), either requiring or allowing attorneys to
disclose client activities that result in death or substantial bodily harm.
This Article asserts that precedent surrounding this disclosure rule
indicates that the rule could be applicable to harms caused by greenhouse
gas emissions. Attorney disclosures, in turn, could impact a wide swath of
greenhouse gas-emitting activities, making it more transparent and, in
certain cases, requiring attorneys to counsel cessation of such activities
or withdraw from representation. Because climate advocacy
organizations are seeking to use all legal tools at their disposal to slow or
stop greenhouse gas emissions, attorney ethics law could present an
additional strategic tool to try and control greenhouse gas emissions
activities. Thus, attorneys from the private sector and in government
should be aware of the potential ethical issues they may face when
handling greenhouse gas-related legal work.
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[Climate change] impacts include greater likelihood of injury and death
due to more intense heat waves and fires . . . foodborne and waterborne
diseases . . . and . . . undernutrition in poor regions. (high confidence)1
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are an attorney working for ExxonMobil in 2014.
ExxonMobil’s shareholders have just won a victory requiring the company to
analyze and disclose financial risks to the company related to greenhouse gas
regulation.2 This comes four years after the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) issued a guidance document detailing how climate change impacts that affect
a company’s bottom line, including risks related to regulatory controls, should be
disclosed in publicly traded filings.3
Your client wishes to respond by putting out an online “one-pager” noting that
the company expects no significant regulation of carbon or greenhouse gases4 for
the next forty years; in other words, any financial risks from regulation are minimal.
You know that between 2010 and 2014, the United States Department of
Transportation and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have
put in place regulations mandating large gains in fuel economy for new motor

1

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate Change 2014: Synthesis
Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, at 68 (Core Writing Team, R. K. Pachauri and
L.A. Meyer eds., 2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/SYR_AR5_FINA
L_full_wcover.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8LM-YAF7] [hereinafter IPCC, Climate Change
2014].
2
See Natasha Lamb & Danielle Fugere, Exxon Mobil’s Commitment to Carbon Asset
Risk Is Just the Beginning, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2014, 12:59 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/exxon-mobil-carbon-asset-risk-pressure
-oil-gas-investors [https://perma.cc/W8TQ-LA5T] (discussing how a shareholder proposal
prompted ExxonMobil to voluntarily committed, in exchange for withdrawal of the proposal,
to publish a report on how it assesses carbon asset risk).
3
Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed.
Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010).
4
Greenhouse gases are so-named because their chemical composition causes heat to be
trapped in Earth’s atmosphere, creating an aptly named “greenhouse effect.” While
greenhouse gases are a significant part of what allows life to flourish on the planet, humanmade greenhouse gas emissions, primarily carbon dioxide and methane from the industrial,
energy, and transportation sectors, are the primary drivers of anthropogenic climate change.
See IPCC, Climate Change 2014, supra note 1, at 4, 44–49.
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vehicles;5 the European Union has expanded its greenhouse gas regulation;6
California has adopted an economy-wide greenhouse gas cap and trade regulatory
system;7 and international negotiations have now focused on all countries, including
the United States, submitting greenhouse gas reduction targets.8 You are also
familiar with the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report,
which ties specific deaths to increasing impacts of climate change from greenhouse
gas emissions, including deaths from heatwaves, disease vectors, wildfires,
droughts, and possibly extreme weather events.9
What do you advise your client about its proposed one-page explanation that it
will not face any significant greenhouse gas regulations during the next 40 years?
What if you advise your client that perhaps the disclosure should be more nuanced
about the possibility of regulation, yet the client refuses to change its proposal? Are
you required to disclose to relevant authorities (in this case the SEC and the New
York State Attorney General) that you believe this one-page disclosure might be
misleading, and that the failure to adequately disclose risks might facilitate the
emission of more greenhouse gases that could kill or injure more people?
Or imagine that you are an EPA attorney working in the Agency’s Office of
Air Quality Planning and Standards at Research Triangle Park in North Carolina
during the Trump Administration.10 Contrary to generally accepted economic data,
and a prior guidance estimating the social cost of carbon (the harm carbon emissions

5

Eyder Peralta, Obama Administration Unveils New Fuel-Efficiency Standards, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Aug. 28, 2012, 12:19 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2012/08/28/160172356/reports-obama-administration-will-unveil-new-fuel-efficiencystandards [https://perma.cc/82G7-NTTN].
6
Toni Johnson, The Debate over Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 3, 2011), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/debate-over-greenhousegas-cap-and-trade [https://perma.cc/LW6R-UA4T] (“The European Union, meanwhile,
continues to expand its Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)--created in 2005 and credited with
helping it meet Kyoto targets.”).
7
Felicity Barringer, California Adopts Limits on Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
20, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/business/energy-environment/californiaadopts-cap-and-trade-system-to-limit-emissions.html [https://perma.cc/E73U-UU6R].
8
David Biello, Climate Talks Consensus: All Countries Should Cut Greenhouse Gas
Emissions--In Future, SCI. AM. (Dec. 11, 2011), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article
/climate-talks-consensus-a/ [https://perma.cc/S2CF-2BSZ].
9
See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate Change 2014:
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects, (Christopher
B. Field et al., eds., 2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5PartA_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y9Q-QNX6].
10
For more information about this EPA office and its role, see Office of Air Quality
Planning and Standards (OAQPS), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/about
epa/about-office-air-and-radiation-oar#oaqps [https://perma.cc/B79B-2Y42] (last visited
Jan. 9, 2019).
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cause) at around forty dollars per ton,11 political appointees at the EPA have
informed you that in new notice and comment rulemakings12 regarding regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions at electricity generating units, you should assume the
social cost of carbon is only one dollar per ton.13 This reduction is based on the new
government policy to only count greenhouse gas emission harms in the United States
(not international harms) and not to incorporate certain future harms, due to
“uncertainty.”14 You know that notice and comment rulemaking is subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act requirement that agency actions cannot be “arbitrary”
or “capricious,”15 and you believe the proposal to be both arbitrary and capricious.
Do you have to advise your political superiors that using the one dollar per ton figure
would be a direct misstatement of all available evidence and contrary to prior
government precedent requiring the EPA to examine costs and benefits of future
generations?
If your superiors still insist upon you employing the one dollar per ton figure
as justification for reducing greenhouse gas regulation, must you withdraw from
representing the government in this case? Even though the rulemaking process will
be fully public, do you have to disclose any confidential information you are aware
of about industry lobbying or conversations on lessening emphasis of scientific and
economic data? Do you have to report this to the authorities because it could
endanger human life? Who would be the authority that could take action to prevent
harm from occurring?
The two fact patterns presented above have occurred. ExxonMobil posted an
online risk disclosure report about the impact of climate change on its business
operations and assets in 2014, claiming that its outlook had not changed and that

11

Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, Technical Support
Document: Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis
Under Executive Order 12866, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY 16 (Aug. 2016),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/sc_co2_tsd_august_2016.
pdf [https://perma.cc/R4LK-CTDQ].
12
Under Section 503 of the Administrative Procedure Act, when promulgating a new
regulation or changing an existing regulation, an agency is required to go through several
procedural steps, including providing the public with “[g]eneral notice” of the proposed rule
and furnishing the “opportunity to participate . . . through submission of written data, views,
or arguments”—i.e., comment—on the proposal. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2018). In accord
with these requirements, this process is often referred to as notice and comment rulemaking.
See, e.g., WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 73–74 (6th ed. 2019).
13
See, e.g., Chris Mooney, New EPA Document Reveals Sharply Lower Estimate of the
Cost of Climate Change, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/10/11/new-epa-document-reveals-sharplylower-estimate-of-the-cost-of-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/UX4K-9GCF].
14
See id.
15
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
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climate change would have no impact on the company.16 In 2017, the Trump
Administration issued a regulatory impact analysis to be used in rulemaking, which
suggests that the harm or cost from greenhouse gas emissions is much lower than
available evidence would suggest.17 We do not have full information about who was
involved in pressing for the rule’s alteration.
Both of these actions have been or will be legally challenged by state attorneys
general. The New York Attorney General sued ExxonMobil for deliberately
misleading its current and prospective investors about the company’s value by its
“longstanding fraudulent scheme” to misstate the likely impact of climate change
regulations on its revenues and assets.18 Several states plan to challenge the legality
of the Trump Administration’s proposed changes to the Clean Power Plan, and
prominent environmental law experts note that the social cost of carbon proposal
would not be justified by science or economics and would thus likely be illegal.19
16
KATHY HIPPLE AND TOM SANZILLO, INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. AND FIN. ANALYSIS,
EXXONMOBIL’S CLIMATE RISK REPORT: DEFECTIVE AND UNRESPONSIVE 1 (2018)
http://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ExxonMobils-Climate-Risk-Report-Defectiveand-Unresponsive-March-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/JK6U-KNGF]; see Press Release,
ExxonMobil, ExxonMobil Releases Reports to Shareholders on Managing Climate Risk
(Mar. 31, 2014), https://news.exxonmobil.com/press-release/exxonmobil-releases-reportsshareholders-managing-climate-risk [https://perma.cc/V68N-H8D3] (referencing the report,
which is no longer publicly available on the Internet); see also Ken Cohen, Managing
Climate Risk, ENERGYFACTOR BY EXXONMOBIL: PERSPECTIVES BLOG (Mar. 31, 2014),
https://energyfactor.exxonmobil.com/perspectives/managing-climate-risk/ [https://perma.cc
/B4DY-345A]; Exxon Mobil Shrugs Off Climate Change Risk to Profit, BBC (Apr. 1, 2014),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-26830555 [https://perma.cc/82LX-JE2J] (“Exxon
Mobil, . . . said in a new report that world climate policies are ‘highly unlikely’ to stop it
from producing and selling fossil fuels in the near future.”).
17
Mooney, supra note 13; see Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Review of the Clean
Power Plan: Proposal, EPA (Oct. 2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201710/documents/ria_proposed-cpp-repeal_2017-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SF3-MVQY].
18
Complaint at 1, New York v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, No. 452044/2018 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., filed Oct. 24, 2018); see also John Schwartz, New York Sues Exxon Mobil, Saying it
Deceived Shareholders on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.ny
times.com/2018/10/24/climate/exxon-lawsuit-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/22QG9NLZ]. In December 2019, the court ruled against the state of New York on its claim that
Exxon violated the Martin Act, a state law designed to combat shareholder fraud. John
Schwartz, New York Loses Climate Change Fraud Case Against Exxon Mobil, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 10, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2sdIAYF [https://perma.cc/6498-BHVJ] [hereinafter
Schwartz, New York Loses Climate Change Fraud Case].
19
Oliver Millman, Fightback Begins over Trumps “Illegal and Irresponsible” Clean
Power Appeal, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2017/oct/10/trump-climate-change-clean-power-plan-fightback [https://perma.cc/R5NYAQQW]; Michael Greenstone & Cass R. Sunstein, Donald Trump Should Know: This Is
What
Climate
Change
Costs
Us,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
15,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/opinion/donald-trump-should-know-this-is-whatclimate-change-costs-us.html [https://perma.cc/PX3WC677]. See generally Montana Envtl.
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But what about the attorneys that surrounded these and similar decisions where
greenhouse gas regulatory requirements may not have been followed? The American
Bar Association (ABA) has already passed a resolution calling for attorney action to
work towards reducing climate change.20 Although attorneys are not bound by ABA
resolutions, official ABA recognition of attorneys’ responsibility to “address climate
change and take action,”21 along with attorneys’ societal obligations in general,22
suggests that attention should be paid to the issue.
Beyond their general ethical obligations, attorneys may also face concern about
specific ethical rules that carry the threat of attorney discipline. Certainly, an
attorney assisting the perpetration of a fraud can face serious ethics charges23—not
to mention be criminally prosecuted in some states.24 Additionally, state ethics rules
provide that an attorney either may or must disclose client behavior if necessary “to
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.”25
But what of the attorneys who simply know of significant emissions that might
be lessened if disclosed? What about the attorneys in the examples above, who
Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Off. of Surface Mining, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (D. Mont. 2017) (holding
that OSMRE’s approval of a coal mining project was arbitrary and capricious when it failed
to consider the costs of additional greenhouse gas emissions via the social cost of carbon),
amended in part, aff’d in part, 2017 WL 5047901 (D. Mont. 2017).
20
AM. BAR ASS’N, Resolution 111, https://johndernbach.com/wp-content/uploads/201
9/08/111-annual-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YN9-9HWE]; see also John Dernbach,
American Bar Association Urges Broad Range of Action to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Emissions “to Net Zero or Below,” JOHN DERNBACH (Aug.12, 2019),
https://johndernbach.com/2019/08/american-bar-association-urges-broad-range-of-actionsto-reduce-u-s-greenhouse-gas-emissions-to-net-zero-or-below/
[https://perma.cc/4ZB9MDYQ].
21
AM. BAR ASS’N, Resolution 111, https://johndernbach.com/wp-content/uploads/201
9/08/111-annual-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YN9-9HWE].
22
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (recognizing
that, among other responsibilities “[l]awyers play a vital role in the preservation of society”).
23
ABA Model Rule 1.2(d) states that an attorney cannot assist a client in the
commission of a crime or a fraud. According to the American Bar Association’s Business
Law newsletter, all states have a form of this rule. William Freivogel, ABA Model Rules and
the Business Lawyer, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0077/
materials/ethics.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8TR-XSJW].
24
See, e.g., Jay Adkisson, Advising About or Assisting with a Fraudulent Transfer Is
About to Get Very Dangerous in California, FORBES (Oct. 28, 2018, 11:04 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2018/10/28/advising-or-assisting-with-a-fraudul
ent-transfer-is-about-to-get-very-dangerous-in-california/#514bc05f118d [https://perma.cc/
REZ7-LDVG] (discussing the recent change to rule 1.2.1 of the California Rules of
Professional Conduct that now makes it an offense to “assist a client in conduct that the
lawyer knows is criminal . . . .” and this rule’s potential effects on attorneys practicing in the
state, given that fraudulent transfers are criminal offenses under California Penal Code
sections 154, 155, and 531).
25
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b). For a full discussion of ABA Model
Rule 1.6 and analogous (and varying) state rules, see infra Part I.

2020]

DISCLOSING THE DANGER

575

advise against actions and then stop direct representation? Are they still required to
disclose their knowledge and belief regarding the legality of actions? Could they
face disciplinary action for failure to do so? The answers to these questions could be
yes in many states.
No state supreme courts have yet applied attorney ethical rules to require
disclosure of dangerous client activities relating to greenhouse gas emissions.
However, given climate activism to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,26 the ease of
filing attorney ethics complaints,27 and requirements to disclose potential ethical
violations of other attorneys,28 the application of ethical rules to representing
greenhouse gas emitters is not only possible but likely.
Ethics rules allowing or requiring disclosure of client confidential information
because of threats to human health and life have been considered applicable to
hazardous waste releases since the 1990s, despite the fact that harms from hazardous
releases often have less definitive timing or less predictable harm as compared to
more traditional threats to life.29 Similarly, the threats from greenhouse gas
emissions also have indeterminate timing and generalized harm, qualities that
distinguish such activities from the threats more traditionally covered by disclosure
rules. But certain differences make ethical complaints about failing to disclose
clients’ impacts on greenhouse gas emissions far more likely.
Few, if any, attorneys have faced ethics complaints because of hazardous waste
releases. This lack of ethics complaints is likely due to the fact that the government
is legally required to correct such releases upon discovery and reporting.30 Because
the government is likely to correct the harms pursuant to its statutory obligations,
attorney disclosures would not “prevent any new harm,” meaning the requirement
to disclose life-threatening information would not apply.31 The same is not true of
climate change. Because of the lack of any comprehensive federal regulatory scheme
to address major greenhouse gas emissions and the scale of the problem, climate
change is fundamentally different from an ethics standpoint than more traditional,
heavily regulated pollution like hazardous waste releases.
26

See infra Part II.
See infra Part IV, for a general description of this process in Texas.
28
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3(a) (“A lawyer who knows that another
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a
substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.”).
29
See Irma S. Russell, Cries and Whispers: Environmental Hazards, Model Rule 1.6,
and the Attorney’s Conflicting Duties to Clients and Others, 72 WASH. L. REV. 409, 413–15
(1997) (discussing Model Rule 1.6 and suggesting changes to the rule to account for
situations where attorney silence can exacerbate environmental catastrophes).
30
For instance, Section 3004(u) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u) (2018), directs federal and state authorities to administer
“corrective action for all releases of hazardous waste” that may occur at a RCRA-permitted
facility.
31
See discussion infra, Part III.
27
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When the dearth of a government obligation or action is coupled with a
sophisticated “climate activism bar,” which is using any and all legal methods in its
arsenal to push for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions,32 the future likelihood
of ethical complaints increases greatly. Climate activism already includes lawsuits
under common law, statutory law, constitutional law, international law, and the
public trust doctrine.33 One litigation avenue that has been missing is the
requirements imposed on attorneys by their state bars. As the deadly nature of
greenhouse gas emissions and our ethical responsibilities as humans and attorneys
becomes more and more discussed in political and regulatory circles,34 that is likely
to change.
Though political discussions in the United States might suggest otherwise,35
there is little doubt that climate change has and will continue to cause untold deaths,
and many more serious health impacts the world over.36 Given that: (1) greenhouse
gas emissions in the aggregate drive climate change,37 (2) credible evidence
concerning fraudulent activities surrounding greenhouse gas reporting,38 and (3)
recent attempts at the federal level to reverse prior climate policy in the face of all

32

Mark Clarke et al., Climate Change Litigation: A New Class of Action, WHITE &
CASE 5 (2018), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publication
s/thought-leadership-climate-change-litigation-18-single-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5J2XDP6] (discussing current trends in climate change litigation).
33
See Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 857–58 (9th Cir.
2012) (holding that federal common law nuisance claims against energy companies for sea
level rise are displaced by the Clean Air Act); see also Humane Soc’y of the United States
v. McCarthy, 209 F. Supp. 3d 280 (D.D.C. 2016) (dismissing an APA claim seeking to
compel an EPA response to a rulemaking petition proposing the regulation of CAFOs as a
stationary source under the Clean Air Acts); Dana Drugmand, France, Home of the Paris
Agreement, Faces Lawsuit for Lack of Climate Progress, CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (Dec.
20, 2018), https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2018/12/20/france-lawsuit-paris-climateagreement/ [https://perma.cc/SSZ6-QGHZ] (“The upcoming lawsuit says . . . the French
government has not adequately addressed climate change, breaching its legal
obligations . . . outlined in international agreements such as the European Convention on
Human Rights, the [UNFCCC], and the Paris Agreement.”); Juliana v. United States, 217 F.
Supp. 3d 1224, 1260–62 (D. Or. 2016) (denying defendant’s motions to dismiss the
substantive due process and public trust doctrine claims of young environmental activists
against the United States for failing to regulate greenhouse gas emissions).
34
See Dernbach, supra note 20.
35
John Swartz, Global Warming Concerns Among Americans Rise in New Poll, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/climate/americans-globalwarming-poll.html [https://perma.cc/S7Q8-3WZ8] (“Political party affiliation is strongly
associated with acceptance of the overwhelming scientific consensus on global warming,
with Democrats tending to accept it and Republicans tending to reject it.”).
36
See infra Part II.
37
See IPCC SPECIAL REPORT (2018), infra note 158, at 2–8 and accompanying text.
38
See infra Part III.
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known evidence,39 attorneys for many large corporate entities and the government
may be subject to attorney ethics complaints for failing to disclose activities related
to greenhouse gas emissions. Yet because this issue has yet to be fully discussed or
explored, an attorney may be woefully unaware of the risk she faces.
While not yet publicly on the radar of legal climate activists, the possibility of
pressuring or influencing attorney behavior using state ethics laws is an opportunity
that climate activists will likely embrace as another arrow in their quiver to avoid,
limit, or publicize greenhouse gas emissions. Even though state supreme courts or
administrative bodies will have the final say on whether their state’s ethical rules
apply to create new disclosure obligations,40 and states can also alter ethics rules by
statute,41 it only takes one state applying ethics rules to clients’ greenhouse gas
emitting activities to create this risk.
This Article examines ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(1) and
analogous state rules regarding disclosure of client actions that could cause possible
death or serious bodily harm. It argues that there are multiple ways in which client
activity dealing with greenhouse gases may expose an attorney to ethical breaches
if she fails to report these activities in certain circumstances.42 Failure to disclose in
certain circumstances may also lead to tort liability and onerous financial exposure
of the attorney.43
The ramifications of potential attorney liability for failing to disclose client
greenhouse gas emissions cannot be completely explored in this Article, but they are
significant. This Article is the first to both articulate greenhouse gas emissions as a
new area of attorney ethics law and posit that this concern will provide a legal and
practical tool that could ultimately reduce greenhouse gas emissions.44 This Article
is not a call to file ethics complaints, but rather a recognition that there is a
substantial possibility of such actions being filed. If the substantive basis for
emissions-based complaints is possible, it is only a matter of time before climate
change activists recognize ethical complaints as a new tactic in one or more states.
As a climate change attack strategy, attorney ethics complaints avoid many of the
more significant impediments to contemporary climate change litigation. Lawsuits
39

See infra Part III.
Eli J. Richardson, Demystifying the Federal Law of Attorney Ethics, 29 GA. L. REV.
137, 148 (1994).
41
Alex Bein, Writing the Rules of Attorney-Whistleblowing: Who Gets to Decide and
How Do We Make the Decision?, 42 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 967, 1001 (2015).
42
Model Rule 1.6(b) is phrased as a permissible disclosure. But several states have
mandatory disclosure rules. Moreover, even permissible disclosure might be made
mandatory by operation of companion rules. See infra Part III.
43
Irma S. Russell, Unreasonable Risk: Model Rule 1.6, Environmental Hazards, and
Positive Law, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 117, 168–69 (1998) [hereinafter Russell,
Unreasonable Risk].
44
Keith W. Rizzardi has an excellent piece on the applications of attorney ethical
responsibilities to making factual statements about climate change impacts. Keith Rizzardi,
Sea Level Lies: The Duty to Confront the Deniers, 44 STETSON L. REV. 75, 75 (2014).
40
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that have sought to compel government action on climate change often face standing
barriers, which prompts many courts to dismiss climate litigation for perceived lack
of remedy.45 Because ethics complaint systems are primarily conducted within state
bars and do not have many of the same formal requirements as bringing an action in
court, there are less barriers to bringing about the intended changes.
Just as attorneys who worked in the tobacco industry were assailed under legal
and ethical standards as more information about tobacco products and marketing
came to light,46 attorneys representing clients in far larger sectors associated with
greenhouse gas emissions—such as energy generation, transportation, and fossil fuel
extraction and refining—may find themselves in ethical crosshairs that many never
realized existed.
Part I of this Article examines Rule 1.6(b)(1) of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, its variation among the states, and related model ethics rules.
Part I then breaks down the various components that must be present under Rule
1.6(b)(1) in order to trigger the rule in a particular state, Texas. Part II examines how
specific client greenhouse gas emissions activity may be considered criminal or
fraudulent, even in jurisdictions (including the majority of the United States) where
greenhouse gases are ostensibly unregulated. These factual scenarios include
emitting greenhouse gases without a permit, failure to quantify and report emissions,
failure to fully disclose financial risk from greenhouse gas-related activities in
corporate filings, and failure to provide, request, or utilize accurate information
regarding the social cost of carbon in environmental reviews in federal or state
permitting situations. Part III examines the requirement of the possibility of
reasonably certain death or bodily harm and shows that this can be met in numerous
situations with greenhouse gas emissions. Part III then examines how the ABA
Model Rules and similar state rules have been interpreted so that the death or bodily
injury need not be traceable to a specific individual, nor be immediate in its harm,
and why reporting would alleviate the threat. Part IV explains how easily ethical
complaints could be brought under the theories developed in Parts I–III, and the
Article concludes with a warning for attorneys to be prepared or risk their
professional careers.
This Article serves as an opening chapter to the application of state attorney
ethics rules to lawyers who represent clients that contribute to climate change. There
are many aspects of the concept that merit further exploration. Future articles will
explore more fully the application of this theory to the specific case of government
45

Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon-Mobil, Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 882 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (concluding that because of the political question doctrine and lack of standing
under Article III, the case must be dismissed), aff’d on other grounds, 696 F.3d 849, 857–58
(9th Cir. 2012); Comer v. Murphy Oil, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 862 (S.D. Miss. 2012)
(finding that the plaintiff’s claims lacked standing because their alleged injuries were not
fairly traceable to the defendants conduct), aff’d, 718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013).
46
Michael V. Ciresi et al., Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota
Tobacco Litigation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 477, 499 (1999).
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attorneys, and other authors are examining the intersection of climate change and
the normative ethical requirements of attorneys.
II. ABA MODEL RULE 1.6(B)(1): CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY
AND DISCLOSING DANGER
Every state has a code of ethical conduct for attorneys.47 The ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct have influenced states’ rules to varying extents.48 Rule
1.6(b)(1) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and the various state
versions based on it, require that an attorney either may or must disclose client
behavior “to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.”49 Or, in
an earlier version adopted by many states, disclosure is triggered if the client
commits a crime that could result in “imminent death or substantial bodily harm.”50
ABA Model Rule 1.6 sets out the general obligation of attorneys to protect
client confidentiality.51 The requirement of client confidentiality is considered a
“bedrock” foundation of justice.52 Rule 1.6 provides that a lawyer “shall not reveal
information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed
consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure is permitted by” designated exceptions.53 The ethical
prohibition against breach of client confidentiality is distinct from the attorney-client

47
See Todd A. Berger, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer
Redux: The New Three Hardest Questions, 7 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS
96, 104 & n.24 (2017) (noting that the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct are the
basis for formal ethics rules in every state except California, which has its own set of rules
for professional conduct).
48
Id.
49
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A lawyer may
reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm; (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to
result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance
of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services; (3) to prevent, mitigate or
rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably
certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance
of which the client has used the lawyer’s services . . . .” (emphasis added)).
50
RUSSELL G. PEARCE ET AL., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A CONTEMPORARY
APPROACH 363 (3d ed. 2017); Russell, Unreasonable Risk, supra note 43, at 127.
51
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6; see also Russell, Unreasonable Risk,
supra note 43, at 124.
52
Gary Rowe, Note, Potential Expansion, or Modification, to the Permissive
Exceptions of Model Rule 1.6: Client-Lawyer Confidentiality in Criminal Law and “The
Gap,” 39 J. LEGAL PROF. 291, 295 (2015).
53
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a); see also PEARCE ET AL., supra note 50,
at 363.
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privilege.54 In some cases, when ethical rules require or allow attorney disclosure to
prevent harm, the attorney-client privilege may also be waived—though there is
wide variation among the states.55
The prohibition against disclosure of confidential information is broad, despite
the exceptions.56 As this Part will discuss in detail, attorneys must balance the
requirement of client confidentiality with the importance of the exceptions to the
requirement—including the exceptions provided in Model Rule 1.6(b), as well as
other rules—and the variation of this model rule in the states.57
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) provides that an attorney may reveal her client’s
confidential information “to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm.”58 The ABA changed this rule in 2002 from the prior disclosure exception “to
prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely
to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.”59 This change broadened the
exception and made clearer its application to accidental dangers.60
Every state has adopted some form of the “death or substantial bodily harm”
exception, although some states have retained the pre-2002 qualifier that the
exception is only triggered by a client’s criminal act.61 Twelve states mandate
disclosure, while thirty-seven states permit disclosure.62 Massachusetts has a hybrid
version.63 Of the states that mandate disclosure, five (Florida, Illinois, North Dakota,
Tennessee, and Washington) mandate disclosure if an attorney “reasonably believes
that a client’s actions may result in reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm.”64 Seven states, including New Jersey, Connecticut, and Texas, have a form
of this rule that mandates disclosure if there is a likelihood of death or substantial
bodily injury when it results from a possible criminal or fraudulent act. For instance,
Rule 1.05(e) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct states:
When a lawyer has confidential information clearly establishing that a
client is likely to commit a criminal or fraudulent act that is likely to result
54
See PEARCE ET AL., supra note 50, at 295; see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
1.6(a) cmt. 3.
55
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct 55:1004 (ABA/BNA, Bloomberg Law 2019); see, e.g.,
Aviles v. State, 165 S.W.3d 437, 439 (Tex. App. 2005) (“We hold that this communication
of an intent to commit a crime is not covered by the attorney-client privilege . . . .”).
56
Russell, Unreasonable Risk, supra note 43, at 124.
57
PEARCE ET AL., supra note 50, at 291.
58
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1).
59
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2001); MODEL RULES
OF PROF’ L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002); see also Russell, Unreasonable Risk,
supra note 43, at 123.
60
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
61
See infra Appendix A.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
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in death or substantial bodily harm to a person, the lawyer shall reveal
confidential information to the extent revelation reasonably appears
necessary to prevent the client from committing the criminal or fraudulent
act.65
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) does not exist in a vacuum and must be interpreted with
other ethical rules as well. For example, ABA Model Rule 1.2(d) states that a lawyer
may not assist a client in the commission of a crime or fraud.66 All states have
adopted a version of Rule 1.2(d).67 ABA Model Rule 1.16(a)(1) provides that a
lawyer must withdraw from representing a client if continuing representation would
violate any ethics rule.68 Thus, if a lawyer’s conduct would assist a client in the
commission of a crime or fraud, the lawyer must withdraw. Moreover, Model Rule
4.1(b) provides that:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: . . .
(b) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is
prohibited by Rule 1.6.69
This suggests that, in certain circumstances, an attorney must disclose
information due to Model Rule 4.1(b), even if the state’s version of Model Rule 1.6
merely permits disclosure. Thus, even in the thirty-seven states that merely permit
disclosure, there is the possibility that the operation of the state’s Rule 4.1(b)
equivalent will then require disclosure.
Many states have also adopted ABA Model Rules 1.6(b)(2) and 1.6(b)(3),70
which require disclosure of a client’s criminal (and sometimes fraudulent) acts that
65

TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05(e) (1989).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
67
Harris Weinstein, Client Confidences and the Rules of Professional Responsibility:
Too Little Consensus and Too Much Confusion, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 727, 735–36 (1994).
68
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(a)(1).
69
Id. r. 4.1(b).
70
Information may be disclosed to:
66

(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's
services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the
client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used
the lawyer's services; . . . .
Id. r. 1.6(b)(2)–(3).
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cause economic damage, even if such acts would not be expected to result in death
or serious bodily harm.71
The states vary in how they interpret the extent of either the requirement or the
privilege to disclose information, both in the extent of the disclosure and in how
certain the attorney has to be concerning the criminal actions or death or substantial
bodily harm.72 Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) limits disclosure to what is necessary to prevent
the harm.73 The related exception in Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) and 1.6(b)(3) allowing
disclosure for criminal or fraudulent acts are limited to the extent necessary to
“prevent, mitigate or rectify” the client’s wrongful acts “in furtherance of which the
client has used the lawyer’s services.”74 In Texas, the requirement to disclose is
predicated upon the attorney having “information ‘clearly establishing’ the
likelihood of such acts and consequences.”75 In evaluating the disclosure
requirement in its Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) equivalent (Rule 1.05(e)), Texas defers to
how the situation “reasonably appears” to the lawyer, and also protects the attorney’s
disclosure by operation of the lesser standard to allow (rather than mandate)
disclosure under the separate “criminal or fraudulent” act exception noted above.76
Because the purpose is to avoid harm, disclosures are theoretically limited to
what is necessary to prevent a future or continuing occurrence, rather than to simply
announce client actions or violations that have wholly occurred in the past.77
Ongoing violations that will continue the harm would thus be subject to the
disclosure rule. In terms of past events, related ethical rules governing prohibitions
against attorney assistance in illegal or fraudulent activity can allow or require
disclosure if the attorney was involved in the action.78 The ethical rule prohibiting
71

Weinstein, supra note 67, at 736. The model rules added this expanded disclosure
exception in 2002 as a response to multiple recent corporate frauds, such as Enron. ABA, A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, 1982–2013 139–42 (2013) [hereinafter “ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY”].
Additionally, in any state, the failure to disclose information about harms may make an
attorney liable in tort if there is a specific victim of the harm. See generally Kevin H. Michels,
Third-Party Negligence Claims Against Counsel: A Proposed Unified Liability Standard, 22
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 143 (Winter 2009) (addressing when attorneys are liable to nonclients
for negligence). Though specific tort claims in greenhouse gas emissions may be unlikely.
See discussion infra Part III.
72
See infra Appendix A.
73
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1); see also Laws. Man. on Prof.
Conduct, supra note 55, at 55:1002; Connecticut Informal Ethics Op. 08-06; Maryland Ethics
Op. 94-27 (1994).
74
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2), 1.6(b)(3); see also Laws. Man.
on Prof. Conduct, supra note 55, at 55:905.
75
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.05 (c)(4) cmt. (1989).
76
Id.
77
See McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1245 (9th Cir. 2003).
78
For example, Model Rule 1.6(b)(3) allows disclosure when the lawyer believes such
disclosure is reasonably necessary to “mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that . . . has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime
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attorney assistance in criminal or fraudulent acts may also come into play if
subsequent occurrences render prior actions newly illegal.79
To recap, depending upon the state, an attorney must or may disclose
confidential information in situations where the attorney reasonably believes the
disclosure is necessary to avoid some form of danger of potential death or serious
bodily harm.80 Further, the states vary in whether or not they require disclosure only
if death or substantial bodily harm would result from a client’s fraudulent or criminal
act.81
Though most states have a Model Rule 4.1(b) counterpart which prohibits
attorney actions aiding a criminal or fraudulent act,82 these rules do not address
situations in which an attorney merely has knowledge of—and has done nothing to
actively aid—a client’s activity that is criminal, fraudulent, or likely to result in death
or substantial bodily harm. This can occur in two distinct situations. First, the
attorney may be aware of dangerous criminal or fraudulent actions because they
occur without or despite attorney advice. For example, an attorney may advise a
client to follow Clean Air Act reporting requirements, but the client might demur.
Since the Clean Air Act requirements apply to the permittee itself rather than on any
person with knowledge of the permittee’s emissions, the attorney would herself not
have aided a criminal act.83
In the second situation, the ethics rule prohibiting an attorney from engaging in
criminal or fraudulent activity is narrower than what a non-attorney might consider
fraudulent or criminal activity. For instance, an attorney’s zealous representation of
a client or legal advice based on an interpretation of whether something is legal does
not mean that the attorney has committed criminal or fraudulent activity under this
ethical rule.84 In other words, as Professors Riesel and Treanor note:
This prohibition [on knowingly counseling or assisting a client to commit
a crime] does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about
the actual consequences that appear likely to result from the client’s
or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services . . . .”). MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(3). In addition, Model Rule 1.16(b)(3) provides that “a
lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if the client has used the lawyer’s services
to perpetrate a crime or fraud.” Id. Further, Model Rule 1.16(a)(1) requires withdrawal if the
representation will result in a violation or rules or other law. Id. r. 1.16(a)(1); see also Laws
Man. on Prof. Conduct, supra note 55, at 55:905; TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.05 (c)(4) cmt. (1989).
79
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 10.
80
See supra notes 47–79 and accompanying text; Pearce, supra note 53, at 363.
81
Laws Man. on Prof. Conduct, supra note 55, at 55:902; Aviles v. State, 165 S.W.3d
437, 439 (Tex. App. 2005); Russell, supra note 29, at 124.
82
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1(b).
83
Daniel Riesel & Victoria Shiah Treanor, Ethical considerations for the Clean Air Act
Attorney, 30(5) THE PRACTICAL REAL EST. LAW. 5, 9 (Sept. 2014).
84
See Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 S.W.3d 477, 483 (Tex. 2015).
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conduct. Nor does the fact that a client uses advice in a course of action
that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course
of action.85
However, even if an attorney’s advice on particular laws may be shielded from
attorney ethics obligations, that is unrelated to whether the client later commits a
criminal or fraudulent act which causes harm that can be rectified by disclosure.
This Article cannot cover every permutation of these rules in the diversity of
states. Instead, an analysis of the law in Texas, which has of one of the narrowest
rules about mandated disclosure, will demonstrate that even when the rule is
restricted to actions that derive from criminal or fraudulent acts, an attorney could
face ethical disclosure requirements with client decisions regarding the emissions of
greenhouse gases. If the Texas standard is satisfied, the requirements in 11 other
states would potentially require disclosure as well. Further, even in the 37 permissive
disclosure states, clients who emit greenhouse gases would still need to be concerned
about the potential disclosure of this behavior.
The remainder of this Article uses the elements of the Texas version of Model
Rule 1.6(b)(1) as an outline to provide an in-depth discussion of the rule’s
applicability to greenhouse gas emissions in many states. In Texas, disclosure of
confidential information under the Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) exception requires the
presence of three elements: 1) a criminal or fraudulent act that is 2) likely to result
in death or substantial bodily harm 3) that could be prevented by the disclosure.86
Part III discusses the applicability of the first element to greenhouse gas-related
activities in and Part IV applies the second and third elements to harms caused by
such activities.
III. CRIMINAL OR FRAUDULENT ACTIONS RELATED TO GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS
A. Criminal Actions Related to Greenhouse Gas Emissions
1. Unauthorized Emissions
When exactly would a client’s emission of greenhouse gases be considered
criminal or fraudulent? Federal laws have criminalized a wide range of harms to the
environment, such as certain unauthorized disposals or emissions, or knowing
85

Riesel & Treanor, supra note 83, at 13 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 1.2 cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)).
86
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.05(e) (2019). Note that the Texas
rule mandates that the act be criminal or fraudulent and requires disclosure while the new
Model Rule does not mandate criminal or fraudulent activity but is permissive. Texas does
not require that the death be “imminent,” as some states do, though this Article will
demonstrate how this is not necessarily a substantial restriction on the application of the
disclosure rules.
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failure to keep or report proper information. For example, the Clean Water Act, a
typical statute, establishes four categories of criminal violations for unauthorized
discharges of pollutants into waters of the United States: negligent violations,
knowing violations, knowing endangerments, and knowing false statements.87
Although there is no general federal greenhouse gas limitation for emissions
sources, several states have adopted such standards. California and the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) states88 limit the emission of greenhouse gases
by specific entities in certain circumstances. In these states, similar to federal
environmental laws regulating other pollutants, emissions may occur but only
pursuant to the terms of a valid permit.89 The emitting entities are also responsible
for properly tracking and surrendering their emission permits at the appropriate
time.90 This applies to all fossil fuel-fired power plants in the RGGI states, as well
as multiple greenhouse gas emission sectors in California.91
This Article will expand on California’s system as an economy-wide program.
California’s program includes very specific limitations and penalties. The California
greenhouse gas cap and trade program sets an emissions cap that declines every
year.92 Covered entities include large emitters, like heavy industry and power
generators, and smaller emitters, like commercial natural gas producers and
transportation fuel providers.93 Under this program, each covered entity has an
emissions allowance for every metric ton of carbon dioxide-equivalent (CO2e) that
the source emits.94 Allowances are allocated to an entity by the government or

87

Clean Water Act §§ 309(c)(1)–(4), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(1)–(4) (2018).
Currently Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode
Island, New York, Delaware, and Maryland. New Jersey may also rejoin. Dana Bate, New
Jersey looks to rejoin regional cap-and-trade program, STATEIMPACT PA. (Jan. 24, 2019,
9:14 PM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2019/01/24/new-jersey-looks-to-rejoinregional-cap-and-trade-program/ [https://perma.cc/B8ZH-WJ4G].
89
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95820 (2019); REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE
MODEL RULE § XX-1.5, 3.1 (2017); For the statutory requirements of individual RGGI
participant states, see State Statutes & Regulations, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE
(2019), https://www.rggi.org/program-overview-and-design/state-regulations. [https://perm
a.cc/EYT4-GJZB].
90
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95856 (2019); REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE
MODEL RULE § XX-6.5(b) (2017).
91
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95101 (2019); REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE
MODEL RULE §XX-1.4 (REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 2017). At the time of this
writing, several other states (such as Washington) are considering some sort of greenhouse
gas permitting requirement.
92
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95891(e)(1) (2019).
93
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95811 (2019).
94
See Cal. Air Res. Bd., Proposed Amendments to the California Cap on Greenhouse
Gas Emissions and Market Based Compliance Mechanisms Regulation: Final
Environmental Analysis Dec. 10, 2018, at 3, https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/regact/2018/capandtrade
88
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acquired through trading, auctions, or offset projects.95 Penalties for failing to
comply with California’s emissions permitting are steep, requiring payment of fines
that are four times the permitting cost.96
The California Air Resources Board (CARB) is given strong enforcement
authority under the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, commonly
referred to as AB 32, to ensure that the cap and trade program operates
successfully.97 CARB has the power to enjoin and set penalties for any violations by
covered entities.98 AB 32 applies the same criminal penalties that are used to enforce
non-vehicular air pollution requirements under Division 26 of the Healthy and
Safety Code (“Code”).99 Criminal penalties under this division include fines and
imprisonment, depending on factors like level of knowledge, type of harm, and
individual or corporate status.100 For example, under Section 42400.3.5 of the Code:
[a]ny person who knowingly violates any rule, regulation, permit, order,
fee requirement, or filing requirement of the state board or of a district . . .
that is adopted for the control of toxic air contaminants . . . is guilty of a
misdemeanor and is subject to a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars
($10,000) or imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months,
or both.101
Willful or intentional emissions of air pollutants in violation of AB 32 have
even more stringent criminal penalties.102 Such a person “is guilty of a misdemeanor
and is punishable by a fine of not more than seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000),
or imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by both that fine and
imprisonment.”103 Additionally, there are several other criminal provisions related
to negligent emissions of air pollutants, failure to take corrective action, and a
general criminal provision for any violations.104 In conclusion, CARB is given a
number of enforcement tools, including criminal penalties, that enable it to
effectively implement the requirements of AB 32’s ambitious cap and trade
program.105
18/finalea.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8S9-KR9K]. A carbon dioxide equivalent emission is the
greenhouse effect of any greenhouse gas expressed in multiple of the same effect from CO2
emissions.
95
Id.
96
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95857(b)(2).
97
Id.
98
Id.; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38580 (Deering 2018).
99
HEALTH & SAFETY § 38580.
100
HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 42400–42400.3.5.
101
HEALTH & SAFETY § 42400.3.5(a).
102
HEALTH & SAFETY § 42400.3(a).
103
Id.
104
HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 42400–42400.2.
105
See generally HEALTH & SAFETY § 38580.
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In addition, greenhouse gas emissions outside of the United States are subject
to legal requirements in specific jurisdictions. As of 2017, sixty-seven jurisdictions,
including the European Union, China, Japan, and New Zealand, either currently or
soon will require permits for the emission of greenhouse gases.106 Moreover, in some
countries, the removal of or a detrimental impact on carbon sinks (such as
rainforests) may be considered criminal acts, as in Brazil.107
2. Failure to Report Emissions
In states which limit greenhouse gas emissions, such as California, there are
extensive rules governing emissions reporting.108 Outside of California and the
RGGI states there are also federal greenhouse gas emissions reporting requirements,
even though there are no direct federal greenhouse gas emissions controls.
The U.S. EPA requires entities of certain sizes to report their greenhouse gas
emissions or face various penalties.109 In a rule finalized in October 2009, the EPA
required that 30 categories of stationary sources must report their greenhouse gas
emissions every year.110 Some must report any emissions, and others must only
report emissions of over 25,000 tons per year of CO2-equivalent.111
The EPA promulgated this regulation pursuant to Sections 114 and 208 of the
Clean Air Act.112 Section 113(c)(1) criminalizes any knowing violations of Section
114’s recordkeeping, monitoring, and inspection requirements.113 Interestingly,
multiple entities have already apparently violated this requirement, though they have
yet to face significant enforcement.114 Failure to enforce, however, has no bearing
on whether or not an action (or inaction) would be considered criminal for purposes
of attorney ethics rules.115 Because the sections of the Clean Air Act mentioned
106

See RICHARD ZECHTER ET AL., WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON
PRICING 10–12 (2017), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2851
0/wb_report_171027.pdf?sequence=7&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/6MFF-RLNF].
107
Nicholas S. Bryner, Brazil’s Green Court: Environmental Law in the Superior
Tribunal de Justiça (High Court of Brazil), 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 470, 507–08 (2012).
108
See generally CAL. CODE REGS. tit.17, §§ 95101–95103, 95111, 95115, 95118,
95152–95153 (2019).
109
See generally 40 C.F.R. Part 98 (2019).
110
Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56260, 56374 (Oct. 30,
2009) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. §§ 98.1–98.9 (2019)).
111
40 C.F.R. § 98.2 (2019).
112
Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. at 56263.
113
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(c), 7414 (2018).
114
Victor Flatt et al., Governance 102: Understanding the Legal/Policy Landscape &
Determining the Best Strategy for Your Organization, ASSOCIATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE
OFFICERS (ACCO) (July 18–20, 2016).
115
Cf. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.05(e) (2019),
https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/ContentDis
play.cfm&ContentID=27271 [https://perma.cc./HB9A-BDSP] (requiring that a lawyer
“shall reveal confidential information to the extent revelation reasonably appears necessary
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above also require records to be “maintained,” if a reporting requirement has been
violated, the crime may still exist until that violation is remedied.116 Federal law is
currently split on whether the failure to report emissions under the Clean Air Act is
a one-time violation or whether the violation continues until the failure to report is
corrected.117 Some courts view a party’s failure to report a known violation as a
continuing violation that begins when the defendant is initially obligated to selfreport its non-compliance and only ends on the day when the defendant reports its
violation.118 Thus, even when a violation is simply a failure to report, there could
still be ongoing harm that requires disclosure.119
B. Fraudulent Actions Related to Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Fraud is defined generally as a knowing “material misrepresentation” for the
purpose of inducing behavior.120 The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct define fraud as conduct that is furthered by using intentionally untrue
statements or with a purpose to deceive.121 Many companies have been accused of
posting misleading or untrue statements about the impact of greenhouse gas
emissions on the company’s bottom line.122
to prevent the client from committing the criminal or fraudulent act”). In other words, this is
a prospective or preventative requirement, lacking any ties to whether the government has
sought to enforce or will seek to enforce the client’s indiscretions.
116
42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1)(A); see also James Miskiewicz & John S. Rudd, Civil and
Criminal Enforcement of the Clean Air Act After 1990 Amendments, 9 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
281, 336–37 (1992).
117
Ivan Lieben, Catch Me If You Can – The Misapplication of the Federal Statute of
Limitations to Clean Air Act PSD Permit Program Violations, 38 ENVTL. L. 667, 668 (2008)
(discussing how “numerous courts ruling on this issue have been sharply divided”).
118
JOEL MINTZ ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 149
(2007) (citing United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F.Supp. 338, 353 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(holding that for each day the facility had incomplete records in violation of the Clean Water
Act, additional fines were added)).
119
Even if a violation is wholly past, failure to report may allow or encourage emissions
of more greenhouse gases that contribute to harm, meeting the “prevent harm” standard.
120
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 10 (AM. LAW.
INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2014).
121
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT, Terminology at 8 (“‘Fraud’ or
‘Fraudulent’ denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive and not merely negligent
misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information.”).
122
Irina Ivanova, Investors Say Facebook, Tesla, and Many Other Companies Are
Hiding Climate Impact, CBS NEWS (June 17, 2019, 8:24 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/climate-change-700-companies-tesla-amazon-facebook-carbon-footprin [https://perm
a.cc/K8JT-2298]; Danielle Haynes, New York AG Sues Exxon Mobil for Misleading
Investors, UPI (Oct. 24, 2018, 4:02 PM), https://www.upi.com/EnergyNews/2018/10/24/New-York-AG-sues-ExxonMobil-for-misleading-investors/1921540402
974/ [https://perma.cc/JJ53-5TYB].
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Attorney ethics cases can give “fraudulent” a broad meaning. For example,
under Texas’s attorney ethics rules, a corporate client’s breach of a fiduciary duty to
creditors is considered fraudulent for purposes of the disclosure exception.123
The federal Securities Act of 1933 requires that investors in publicly traded
companies receive all material information about those securities and prohibits
deceit, misrepresentation, and any fraud related to the sales of such securities.124
Thus, mischaracterizing or failing to include material information on a required
report or document may be a fraudulent act. According to a seminal U.S. Supreme
Court case:
The question of materiality, it is universally agreed, is an objective one,
involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a
reasonable investor. Variations in the formulation of a general test of
materiality occur in the articulation of just how significant a fact must be
or, put another way, how certain it must be that the fact would affect a
reasonable investor’s judgment.125
In the early 1970s, the SEC noted that environmental regulation could be
important to a company’s business prospects and required disclosure of these
regulations that were material.126 In 2010, an SEC interpretive guidance document
addressed disclosure requirements related to the impact of public companies’
operations and products on greenhouse gas emissions.127 In this guidance, the SEC
noted that climate change risks could affect company value through asset exposure
as well as through regulation.128 Because of investment in companies that profit from
fossil fuel sales, the financial risks of a quick move away from fossil fuels could also
cause financial disruption across a wide array of companies.129 In September 2018,
the United Kingdom’s banking governor, Mark Carney, again sounded the alarm on
risks of economic impacts from a fossil fuel transition to the financial stability of
banks.130
123

Prof’l Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Texas, Texas Ethics Op. 603 (2010),
https://www.legalethicstexas.com/Ethics-Resources/Opinions/Opinion-603 [https://perma.
cc/9DX6-ETSX].
124
15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-1(a)(4)–(5) (2018).
125
T.S.C. Industries, Inc. v. Northway Industries, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976).
126
Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed.
Reg. 6290, 6292 (Feb. 8, 2010).
127
See generally id.
128
Id. at 6291.
129
TOM SANZILLO ET AL., INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS, THE FINANCIAL
CASE FOR FOSSIL FUEL DIVESTMENT 4–5 (2018), http://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018
/07/Divestment-from-Fossil-Fuels_The-Financial-Case_July-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/56
N4-WKCH].
130
Benjamin Hulac, Climate Is ‘Mainstream’ Risk in Banks, Regulator Says, E&E
NEWS: CLIMATEWIRE (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2018/09/27/
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After the publication of the SEC’s 2010 guidance, many companies did include
climate change reporting in disclosure documents.131 But in 2016, the Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board found that compliance in these first few years had been
limited and was “mostly boilerplate,” especially with respect to regulatory risks.132
Further, the Trump Administration revoked the 2010 guidance.133 However, this
guidance revocation does not repeal the statutory requirement that all material risks,
including any risks from climate change, be disclosed. Further, the maturation of
understanding of the risks of climate change means the disclosure requirements may
be expanding rather than shrinking. In fact, reports of companies’ disclosures in
recent years reflect such an expanding interpretation. The private Task Force on
Climate-Related Financial Disclosure reported in 2018 that more and more
companies are expanding the breadth of what they disclose, and especially
disclosure of financial risk from climate change regulation.134
In addition to SEC disclosure requirements, greenhouse gas disclosure
requirements could be required under state anti-fraud statutes.135 In 2015, the New
York State Attorney General moved aggressively to demand more climate-related
regulatory and legal risk disclosure to comply with the New York anti-fraud
statute136 and investigated ExxonMobil for possibly lying to investors about climate
change risk.137 As noted above, this investigation led to an indictment of

stories/1060099897 [https://perma.cc/5UPZ-VYYJ].
131
SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, CLIMATE RISK TECHNICAL
BULLETIN 86–87 (2016), https://www.eenews.net/assets/2016/10/20/document_cw_01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7U7R-L6GR].
132
Id.
133
See Caitlin Meagher, Leaving Investors in the Dark: The SEC’s Growing Silence on
Guidance Related to the Business and Legal Developments on Climate Change, GEO. ENVTL.
L. REV. (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/environmental-law-review/blog/
leaving-investors-in-the-dark-the-secs-growing-silence-on-guidance-related-to-the-business
-and-legal-developments-on-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/5M48-EDKJ].
134
TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, TASK FORCE ON CLIMATERELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES: STATUS REPORT 1 (2018), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/FINAL-2018-TCFD-Status-Report-092518.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EWL2-UWXE].
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Tom Mounteer et al., Dialogue, Informing Investors of Climate Risk: The Impact of
Securities Laws in the Environmental Context, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10455,
10455 (2016).
136
Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352, 352-C (McKinney 2019).
137
Justin Gillis & Clifford Krauss, Exxon Mobil Investigated for Possible Climate
Change Lies by New York Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/06/science/exxon-mobil-under-investigation-in-newyork-over-climate-statements.html [https://perma.cc/7KEB-46U9].
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ExxonMobil for intentionally deceiving its shareholders and investors about the
various financial risks posed to the company by climate change regulations.138
The decision not to disclose information or provide misinformation may also
be considered fraud in some circumstances. In the wave of litigation against tobacco
companies during the 1990s, attorneys were involved in schemes to shield relevant
information by attorney-client privilege.139 In those cases, the very attempt at
shielding was determined to be fraudulent because it was designed to keep material
information from going public.140
Legal scholars who have recently analyzed this question opine that the answer
to whether assisting in deliberate misinformation by a client violates ethics rules is
“frustratingly opaque.”141 Though uncertain, considering the aggressive stances of
some state attorneys general,142 in at least some circumstances, an attorney’s
assistance or knowledge of the misstatement or failure to state relevant facts could
be an ethics violation, even without the requirement to report a client activity that
would endanger human health.
In sum, failure to have proper emissions permits, failure to report emissions
pursuant to EPA and state rules, and failure to adequately report financial risk from
a firm’s greenhouse gas emissions or impacts could be considered criminal,
fraudulent, or both.143
C. The Special Case of the Government Regulatory Attorney
What of the attorney at the EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards
in Research Triangle Park, North Carolina? Even defining the client is difficult:

138

Schwartz, supra note 18. In December 2019, the court ruled against the state of New
York on its claim that Exxon violated the Martin Act. See Schwartz, New York Loses Climate
Change Fraud Case, supra note 18.
State anti-fraud statutes could also apply to greenhouse gas offset sales if the offsets do
not deliver reductions as advertised and the purveyor knew or had reason to know this. See,
e.g., Alan Ramo, The California Offset Game: Who Wins and Who Loses?, 20 HASTINGS W.
NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 109, 148 (2014) (discussing potential fraud in California offsets).
139
Ciresi et al., supra note 46, at 499.
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Id. at 498–99.
141
Katrina Fischer Kuh, Malignant Normality, LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK
(Nov. 11, 2018), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental_law/2018/11/malignantnormality.html [https://perma.cc/78E6-W884].
142
See Gillis & Krauss, supra note 137.
143
In addition to U.S. reporting requirements, significant requirements exist in other
jurisdictions in which large American corporations do business. For example, the European
Union’s Non-financial Reporting Directive (Directive 2014/95/EU) mandates disclosure of
greenhouse gas emissions without regarding to financial materiality. GRI & CSR EUROPE,
MEMBER STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE 2014/95/EU 12–13 (2018),
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/NFRpublication%20online_version.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TU9U-ARFL].
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For example, the client of the government lawyer can be characterized as
the public as a whole, the government as a whole, the branch of
government served by the lawyer, an agency or entity advised by the
lawyer, or an officer or decision-maker advised by the lawyer.144
Regardless of whoever the client is, attorney ethics rules apply to government
attorneys as well.145 Moreover, the issue here is not so much the disclosure of a
change in government policy regarding dangerous greenhouse gas emissions—in
our example, that information would most likely be public. But the attorney may
have non-public information that, if known, could make the rulemaking (and the
concomitant increase in greenhouse gases) less likely. For example, the attorney
may have information (such as internal debates or outside influences) related to the
rulemaking discussed in the introduction that might violate the APA or enabling
statute. Similarly, the extensive suppression of scientific information under the
Trump Administration that is often required for rulemaking146 might merit
disclosure, as it would impact final agency decisions and court rulings on such
decisions. In any event, even if a government attorney had no new information to
disclose, ethics might impose an obligation to withdraw,147 which could accomplish
much the same purpose of stymying the improper action.
Does misstating or omitting information during federal notice-and-comment
rulemaking rise to the level of “criminal or fraudulent activity”? In most cases in the
history of the U.S. administrative state, the answer to this question would surely
have been “no,” simply because of the difficulty in defining misinformation. Even
as various presidential administrations have sought to bring about their own policy
priorities through interpretations of existing rules, the worst that was said before the
Trump Administration was that the proposed rule was not consistent with the statute.
For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the Bush
Administration’s proposed changes to the Routine Maintenance Repair Exception
(RMRR) in New Source Review under the Clean Air Act violates the Clean Air

144

Rizzardi, supra note 44, at 76 (revealing that the question of who government
attorneys represent is a controversial one under ethics law); see Nancy Leong, AttorneyClient Privilege in the Public Sector: A Survey of Government Attorneys, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 163, 163 (2007) (discussing whether attorney-client privilege extends to government
entities).
145
Rizzardi, supra note 44, at 76.
146
See JACOB CARTER ET AL., CTR. FOR SCIENCE & DEMOCRACY AT THE UNION OF
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE STATE OF SCIENCE IN THE TRUMP ERA 1, 10–13 (2019),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2019/01/ucs-trump-2yrs-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KA76-TFFE].
147
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018)
(requiring withdrawal or termination of representation if continuing “the representation will
result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law”).
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Act.148 Many scholars have argued that the Obama Administration’s Clean Power
Plan (CPP) also exceeded statutory authority, but no appellate court decision has
been rendered on that specific claim as of March 2020.149 But while political actors
may use hyperbolic words such as “usurpation” of authority, none have
characterized these actions as criminal or illegal.150
As in many other ways, it is possible that the Trump Administration is different
and has crossed a line in determining the social cost of carbon in the new climate
change rule for power plants discussed in the introduction or in other rulemakings.
Much evidence exists that many administrative actions taken by various agencies
under the Trump Administration are done with complete knowledge that they are
neither legally tenable nor factually accurate. 151 The Trump Administration is also
the first to retain business entanglements in the White House.152 While the U.S.
Supreme Court has shown little appetite for tarnishing government policy because
of President Trump’s intent,153 it is unknown how any number of state supreme
courts would view some of the Trump Administration’s activities.
148

New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880, 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cert denied, 550 U.S. 928

(2007).

149

See West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 29593 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 17, 2019) (dismissing set of cases initiated in 2015 challenging CPP as moot because
of forthcoming EPA rulemaking that will repeal and replace the CPP); see also Repeal of
Clean Power Plan, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019); Juan Carlos Rodriguez, EPA Poised
to Replace Clean Power Plan, DC Circ. Hears, LAW360 (Sept. 17, 2018, 8:45 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1083348 [https://perma.cc/UEX7-633V] (“The litigation
has been on hold since April 2017, when the D.C. Circuit issued its first 60-day stay.”);
Petition for Review, at 2, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir., 2015) (No. 15-1363),
https://ago.wv.gov/publicresources/epa/Documents/File-stamped%20petition%2015-1363
%20(M0108546xCECC6).pdf [https://perma.cc/SN3N-GXKX] (arguing that “Petitioners
will show that the final rule is in excess of the agency’s statutory authority, goes beyond the
bounds set by the United States Constitution, and otherwise is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion and not in accordance with law.”).
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See, e.g., Sabrina Siddiqui, Marco Rubio Attacks EPA and Pledges to Reverse Key
Obama Climate Moves, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/sep/02/marco-rubio-energy-policy-epa-climate-change [https://perma.cc/Q4L2FAUN] (finding that: “You can read [the Clean Power Plan] as a usurpation of states’
rights.”).
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THE HILL (Dec. 7, 2018, 9:42 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/420221tillerson-trump-would-ask-me-to-do-things-that-i-couldnt-legally-do [https://perma.cc/6JS
C-5DF7].
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David Leonhardt & Ian Prasad Philbrick, Trump’s Corruption: The Definitive List,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/opinion/trumpadministration-corruption-conflicts.html [https://perma.cc/RZZ8-XEJQ].
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See Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear, Trump’s Travel Ban Is Upheld by Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/us/politics/supre
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In his seminal article on climate science and public officials, Professor Rizzardi
noted that it should be a clear ethical violation for an attorney to deliberately misstate
accepted scientific facts about climate change.154 Attorneys are the primary drafters
of notice-and-comment rulemaking.155 If these same government attorneys would be
considered as assisting in spreading disinformation by rulemaking they may face a
responsibility to withdraw from representation or be in violation of ethical rules.156
IV. LIKELY TO RESULT IN DEATH OR SUBSTANTIAL BODILY HARM THAT IS
PREVENTABLE
A. The Harms from Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Even if a particular facility that emits greenhouse gases is a small contributor
to the overall amount of greenhouse gases in the air, there is no doubt that climate
change as a whole will create the danger of death and substantial bodily injury.
Overall, the process of global warming has been strongly linked to future serious
harm to persons across the globe. According to the Climate Vulnerability Monitor,
climate change is estimated to kill over 400,000 persons worldwide every year, and
the total number of deaths attributable to carbon pollution (including deaths from air
pollution and workers, for example) raises the toll to 4.5 million.157 These direct and
indirect climate change impacts can be explored in several different categories.
1. Direct Human Health Impacts
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report
on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial
temperature levels (“IPCC Report”), there is no question that any increase in global
temperatures will affect human health.158 Specifically, if global average
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/politics/census-citizenship-questionsupreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/YC9U-698K] (noting that the Supreme Court did look
beneath the proffered reason for the Trump administration action).
154
Rizzardi, supra note 44, at 116.
155
Thomas O. McGarity, The Role of Government Attorneys in Regulatory Agency
Rulemaking, 61 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 19 (1998).
156
Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a
Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L. J. 1671, 1748–49 (2012).
157
DARA & CLIMATE VULNERABLE FORUM, CLIMATE VULNERABILITY MONITOR 2ND
EDITION: A GUIDE TO THE COLD CALCULUS OF A HOT PLANET 17 (2012),
https://daraint.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/CVM2-Low.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CJ83LPT7]. But see Climate Change and Health, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health [https://perm
a.cc/MKT3-HL4R] (estimating that climate change causes 250,000 deaths per year).
158
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT: GLOBAL
WARMING OF 1.5ºC, at 180 (2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06
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temperatures rise 1.5 degrees Celsius, there will be increases in heat-related
morbidity and mortality, ozone-related mortality, and an exacerbated transmission
of vector-borne diseases. 159 Additionally, undernutrition will increase as global food
security is undermined from the impacts of climate change on food-producing
regions.160 For example, fisheries and aquaculture will be negatively impacted by
ocean acidification, and agriculture will be negatively impacted by increases in
extreme weather events and pests.161
2. Droughts, Fires, and Floods
The IPCC Report also indicates high confidence in dryness trends in some
regions, particularly in the Mediterranean region, southern Europe, northern Africa,
and the Near East.162 Furthermore, the report also projects that river flooding and
extreme runoff are expected to increase on a global scale.163 Increases in both
droughts and floods are going to have countless negative impacts on human health,
from stressing global food security to decreasing freshwater drinking supplies.164
The IPCC additionally predicts that wildfires will increase as global temperatures
rise.165 Wildfires will also have a variety of impacts, such as human mortality,
destruction of homes and infrastructure, and destruction of forests and vegetation
(which are important carbon sinks).166
3. Coastal Vulnerabilities: Sea Level Rise and Storms
Increased heat in the upper layers of the ocean has already exacerbated the
intensity of tropical storms and hurricanes, and as the global temperatures continue
to rise, these storms are only expected to increase in severity.167 Additionally, with
the melting of land and marine-based ice sheets due to increased global
temperatures, sea levels are expected to continue to rise.168 Thus, our planet’s
heavily populated coastal regions will be particularly vulnerable to climate
change.169

/SR15_Full_Report_High_Res.pdf
SPECIAL REPORT (2018)].
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 211.
163
Id. at 203.
164
Id. at 239.
165
Id. at 219.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 203.
168
Id. at 257.
169
Id. at 231.

[https://perma.cc/87EV-BL2D]

[hereinafter

IPCC

596

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

4. Geo-Political Security Issues: Migration & Conflict
The IPCC Report reveals that human retreat and migration are increasingly
being considered as a form of adaptation to climate change.170 For example, the
IPCC Report states that “[t]ropical populations may have to move distances greater
than 1,000 km if global mean temperature rises by 2°C from 2011–2030 to the end
of the century.”171 This increased human displacement will cause significant
political and economic strain on regions, both in those that are losing and those that
are gaining in population.172
Additionally, the IPCC Report finds that the increase in drought due to climate
change “increases the likelihood of sustained conflict for particularly vulnerable
nations or groups, owing to the dependence of their livelihood on agriculture.”173
Furthermore, studies have found that “[a] 1ºC increase in temperature or more
extreme rainfall increases the frequency of intergroup conflicts by 14%.”174 Thus,
nations will not only have to grapple with changes in their climate and health but
also those social and economic changes that come with human displacement and
conflict.175
Since 2018, the reporting, specificity, and linkage of catastrophic harms to
greenhouse gas emissions has also increased.176 Though not a scientific body, the
ABA House of Delegates passed a resolution recognizing the danger of climate
change in 2019, calling on all levels of government and the private sector to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.177 This resolution should translate to constructive
knowledge on the part of all U.S. attorneys of the dangers of greenhouse gases.
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OBSERVATORY 2–5 (2018) https://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/icecaps/research/media_cover
age/summaries/special_issue_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX7X-4ZSE] (describing an
overall increase in media attention to climate change and noting global greenhouse gases
make heat waves more frequent and intense).
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John Dernbach, American Bar Association Urges Broad Range of Actions to Reduce
U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions “to Net Zero or Below,” JOHN DERNBACH BLOG (Aug. 12,
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HZ6-YXRX]; ABA Resolution 111 (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/images/news/2019/08/am-hod-resolutions/111.pdf
[https://perma.cc./GD66K7W9].
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B. Climate Change Impacts from Greenhouse Gas Emissions May Trigger a Duty
to Disclose, Even If the Harms Are Not Temporally Immediate or Traceable to a
Specific Victim
When Model Rule 1.6(b) was created in 1983, the paradigmatic case of
revealing client confidences to prevent the taking of life or infliction of substantial
bodily harm was when an attorney knew of a specific threat by a client to kill or
harm persons directly.178 However, early on, the ABA and courts recognized that
more temporally remote harms, such as harm from hazardous waste, or other
environmental harms, also constituted a situation in which there would be a
substantial threat of a loss of life or serious bodily injury.179 The amendment to
Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) in 2002 was specifically done to ensure coverage of more
remote environmental harms, and to expand the privilege of disclosure beyond
situations where the harm results from a criminal or fraudulent act, to even to apply
to environmental harms and breaches that are accidental.180 The comment on Model
Rule 1.6(b)(1) makes its application to disclosure of environmental harms that
threaten human life or substantial bodily harm crystal clear, stating:
[A] lawyer who knows that a client has accidentally discharged toxic
waste into a town’s water supply may reveal this information to the
authorities if there is a present and substantial risk that a person who drinks
the water will contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the
lawyer’s disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the
number of victims.181
Moreover, the impacts of the harm do not have to be immediate, but simply
foreseeable. The alteration of Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) in 2002, replacing the word
“imminent” with “reasonably certain,” was designed to make sure the disclosure
exception included both a present and a substantial threat of a future injury.182
Several courts have similarly recognized the timing disconnect of cause and
effect in the hazardous substances context, and have broadened the ordinary
meaning of “imminence” to cover temporally remote harm from hazardous
substances.183 For example, in Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the operation of a hazardous waste site in an
178
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179
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180
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182
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Nicholas Targ, Attorney Client Confidentiality in the Criminal Environmental Law
Context: Blowing the Whistle on the Toxic Client, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 227, 256–57
(1996).
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inappropriate location was a “serious” and “imminent” threat to public health, even
if it was unclear when or whether the harm would occur.184 In other similar cases,
courts have held that a small probability of harm in the short term does not foreclose
the concept of a high probability of dangerous harm in the long term.185 The meaning
of “imminent” is thus defined by the likelihood of harm as opposed to the immediacy
of the harm.186
C. Harms from Only Some Disclosed Greenhouse Gas Emissions Need Not Be
the Sole Cause of the Harm
Obligations to disclose information about dangerous hazardous waste parallel
greenhouse gases in another way: in both cases, harm may arise not just because of
the impact of one client’s dangerous release, but rather from a combination of
releases, either because of cumulative risk or synergistic risks. Because liability
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA)187 is often joint and several or cumulative, Nicholas Targ wrote in
the 1990s that an attorney should have discretion to report a release of hazardous
wastes that could lead to death or serious bodily harm, even if the harm could not be
directly traced to the client’s release.188
It is similarly difficult to separate harm caused by even a significant amount of
greenhouse gas emissions with respect to any other sources. But as Targ suggested
under ethics rules, the fact that certain emissions combine with others to form harm
does not absolve the party who partially caused the injury from responsibility.189
Case law in other contexts, as discussed below, has also suggested that the
cumulative nature of greenhouse gases should not defeat the ability to hold someone
responsible for or to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.
Though several common law nuisance cases have been halted because of the
“universal effect” of greenhouse gases,190 other cases have recognized that merely
184
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because a specific actor’s contribution may be small relative to the total amount of
greenhouse gas emissions worldwide does not mean that the source cannot be
considered or that responsibility for that harm cannot be attributed to a subset of all
sources that emit greenhouse gas.
For instance, in August 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit ordered federal regulators to closely consider downstream
greenhouse gas emissions from the Sabal Trail pipeline, even though the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) argued against that interpretation, claiming
that analyzing emissions from natural gas sent through the pipeline was too
speculative.191 The court posited:
What are the “reasonably foreseeable” effects of authorizing a pipeline
that will transport natural gas to Florida power plants? First, the
transported gas will be ultimately burned to produce energy in power
plants. This is not just “reasonably foreseeable,” it is the project’s entire
purpose, as the pipeline developers themselves acknowledged. . . . It is just
as foreseeable, and FERC did not dispute, that burning natural gas will
release exactly the type of carbon compounds that will contribute to
climate change.192
This reasoning was echoed by a Tenth Circuit decision in September 2017
looking at the requirements for environmental reviews of federal coal leases.193 That
court excoriated the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) position that emissions
must not be considered from coal leasing because the emissions will come from
other coal mined elsewhere, if not the coal that was to be leased in the decision at
issue.194 The court noted the economic falsity of the BLM’s argument, held the
agency’s decision to be arbitrary and capricious, and, in so doing, relied on the
incremental effects of greenhouse gas emissions from the leases on the climate.195
Two more district court cases from the Tenth Circuit have followed this reasoning,

irrelevant whether any defendant ‘contributed’ to the harm because a discharge, standing
alone, is insufficient to establish injury.”), aff’d on other grounds, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.
2012), cert. denied 569 U.S. 1000 (2013).
191
Sierra Club v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1371–72 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
192
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WildEarth Guardians v. Bureau of Land Management, 870 F.3d 1222, 1234–35
(10th Cir. 2017).
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Id. at 1236 (“Even if we could conclude that the agency had enough data before it
to choose between the preferred and no action alternatives, we would still conclude this
perfect substitution assumption arbitrary and capricious because the assumption itself is
irrational (i.e., contrary to basic supply and demand principles) . . . Second, the BLM’s
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change)”).
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noting that the incremental effects of federal fossil fuel leasing likely culminated in
a significant environmental impact that should be considered.196
The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized that disparate greenhouse gas
emission sources work together to cause climate change and that even a small
percentage amount is enough to satisfy the harm and redressability prongs of
standing. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court rejected the government’s
argument that the plaintiffs should not have standing because the emissions that were
complained of were such a small portion (6% of global CO2 emissions) of the global
impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change.197 The court noted that it is
the fact that the law can do something, even if it is a “tentative first step,” that allows
a court to find causation and redressability.198
While it may be true that regulating motor-vehicle emissions will not by
itself reverse global warming, it by no means [impacts] whether EPA has
a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it . . . Because of the enormity of the
potential consequences of climate change, the fact that the effectiveness
of a remedy might be delayed . . . is essentially irrelevant . . . A reduction
in domestic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increase,
no matter what happens elsewhere.199
Common law torts also support attaching responsibility to even small
contributors to a harm. If it becomes impossible to causally disentangle one party’s
actions from the cumulative harm, according to common law, tort liability attaches
to all parties.200 When joint actors cause indivisible harm, they are all equally
responsible for the damages caused under the theory of “joint and several”
liability.201
“Joint and several” liability from torts has been applied to CERCLA liability
when there are intermingled hazardous wastes in which the impact of one contributor
cannot be legally separated from that of another.202 Liability can attach even if the
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specific potentially responsible party (PRP) is a relatively small contributor.203
Though much of CERCLA case law in this area is dependent on the expansive intent
of the CERCLA statute, the sharing of liability, even liability attributable to
relatively minor contributors, is grounded in the common law theories which
underlie the joint and several liability standard.204
D. Where Is the Line Drawn?
Assuming reporting of greenhouse gas emissions may be required under some
circumstances, is there a minimum level of greenhouse gas emissions that would not
require an attorney to report? Or are any client’s emissions of the smallest magnitude
a potential ethical issue? There are two different ways to look at this question. Is
there a legal minimum threshold below which there is no harm that can be defined?
Or alternatively, is there a practical limit?
First, it is important to note that so-called natural emissions of CO2 would not
legally qualify as a potential human harm requiring reporting since natural emissions
do not contribute to anthropogenic climate change per se. The Earth requires a
certain amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to make the planet habitable
at all.205 The dangers humanity faces from greenhouse gas emissions is in the change
and the rate of change of the greenhouse gas concentration in Earth’s atmosphere.206
This accelerating rate of concentration began during the Industrial Revolution, and
is therefore attributable to modern human societies.207 Thus, emissions from animal
and human respiration, or the natural water cycle, should not be identifiable as
cognizable harms under Model Rule 1.6 because they are not attributable to postindustrial technologies.
This leaves us with greenhouse gases that were produced through a multitude
of anthropogenic sources since the Industrial Revolution. As noted in the discussion
in Section III.C, if the reasoning of the tort cases and CERCLA cases on joint and
several liability is applied in the greenhouse gas context, there would seem to be no
specific legal minimum for any of these emissions which do contribute to climate
change. Any amount of greenhouse gas emissions contribute to the injuries caused
by climate change, and thus any amount of emissions could be deemed dangerous.
The Supreme Court had no problem finding a 6% annual contribution to global
carbon dioxide emissions as a cause of harm.208 Certainly, the comment to Model
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Rule 1.6 concerning the discharge of hazardous substances into a public water
supply does not specify a minimum limit as long as there is, in fact, a hazard.209
This suggests that for a company’s emissions not to reach the level of deadly
harm, the emitted quantity would have to be such that it would not rise to the
percentage where it would harm even one human life. For example, if climate change
currently causes 400,000 deaths per year (as noted in the DARA report),210 and the
quanity of greenhouse gas emissions annually is around 53.5 billion tons,211 then it
would take 132,500 tons of greenhouse gases to be responsible for one statistical
death. In 2007, the Scherer coal-fired power plant in Juliette, Georgia emitted
25,300,000 tons of CO2 in one year,212 or enough for approximately 190 deaths. For
comparison, the average automobile in the United States emits about 6 tons of CO2
every year,213 meaning that an individual car would have to operate for around
22,000 years to cause one death using this simple metric and calculation.
Of course, such calculations are not specific and are beset by many caveats.
The UN estimate of deaths per year that climate change may cause is just that: an
estimate. The amount of emissions in any given year is also an estimate, and the
accepted figure used above includes land-use changes as well as direct emissions
from industrial and transportation sources. Moreover, climate change impacts
happen not just because of one year’s emissions of greenhouse gases, but because
of the cumulative impact from emissions that have built up in the atmosphere.214 The
current level of anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent in the atmosphere has been
building for some time—though over half of these emissions have occurred since
1988.215
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All of these concerns indicate that some kind of bright-line legal threshold,
while technically possible to develop, is difficult to calculate. By way of example,
however, it highlights the workability of a standard that mirrors the scale of
magnitude between large industrial sources of CO2 and smaller ones associated with
individual actions, such as driving a car. Tort law can hold a party responsible for
one death or harm, even if it only contributed to a small percentage cause of that
death.216 However, this considerable difference in scale for emitters of greenhouse
gases exemplifies that attorney ethics law should not recognize harm from every
single source of greenhouse gas emissions, but only major sources. A practical
minimal harm threshold may therefore be more workable, which is also supported
by most tort cases. Though technically any number of tortfeasors could combine in
one causal set to harm another, in actual cases, the number of responsible parties is
typically relatively small. While tort cases may have thousands or more plaintiffs in
class action suits, it is rare to have as large a number of defendants as the plethora
of greenhouse gas emitters.217
In tort cases, potential defendants identified for liability tend to be the largest
or major causes of a particular harm, even if they are among a larger group of
potential joint tortfeasors.218 The same is true of CERCLA. The EPA will shield
from liability any de micromis settler, defined as a contributor of less than 110 or
200 gallons of a waste in certain circumstances, or less than 0.002% of the waste by
volume.219
All of this suggests that some kind of rule of reason can be developed that
identifies which greenhouse gas emitters should be considered as causing imminent
death or serious harm. As stated in the tort context, a determination of whether it is
“worth it” to become a plaintiff depends on: “(1) the perception of a harm, (2) the
perceived knowledge of compensability for that harm, (3) a desire to participate in
the tort system, and (4) access or an opportunity to participate in the tort system
without major impediments.”220
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Similarly, whether it is “worth it” for an attorney to face a risk of failing to
report information that would be required to avert human death or serious harm will
depend on multiple factors, though most important will be the potential harm that
the client’s action causes. Since, in Texas and some other states, the ethical
disclosure requirement can only be triggered if the client has committed a fraud or
crime,221 that alone can serve as a triggering threshold for identifying harm. If an
action is demonstrably fraudulent or constitutes a legal violation, perforce it is of
concern to society, presumably because the legal requirement is needed to prevent
some danger. While in the case of fraud the danger may be tied to a financial or
property interest, rather than a mortal danger, these harms still speak to the
significance of the unlawful action.
E. Reporting to Avoid Harm
One other standard that must be present to require an attorney to report client
behavior that could result in death or serious bodily injury is that the reporting can
be expected to assist in averting that harm.222
As noted in Part II.A.2, courts are split on whether environmental reporting
violations constitute an ongoing harm or a past harm.223 One court that has found an
ongoing harm noted that the failure to report can lead to demonstrable harm long
after the reporting date has passed, since a failure to report would continuously
hobble an agency’s enforcement ability.224 Information deemed material at one time
may still be material in the future. For any of the violations discussed in this Article,
one could arguably claim that exposing the violation is likely to either encourage
some amelioration of harm or discourage continued violations in the future.
The mere presence of public information may itself reduce harmful emissions
or risk.225 Emission reporting statutes, such as the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)226 are predicated on the observed trend
that entities will voluntarily reduce the amount of legal emissions to avoid public
scrutiny.227 EPCRA requires companies to report toxic chemicals to the EPA, and
the information is stored in a publicly accessible database called the federal Toxics
Release Inventory (TRI).228 “TRI aims squarely at measuring and disclosing the
environmental performance of those parties most directly responsible for significant
221
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environmental impacts, with the aim of thereby improving performance
outcomes.”229
Mark Latham has suggested that treating greenhouse gases the same as toxics
for reporting purposes under EPCRA would encourage companies to lessen those
emissions, which in turn would lessen the potential harm in the future.230
The importance of reporting is also the reason for many voluntary greenhouse
gas emission reporting program standards, such as those required for members of
the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP).231 As the CDP states: “We must act urgently
to prevent dangerous climate change and environmental damage. That starts by
being aware of our impact so that investors, companies, cities and governments can
make the right choices now.”232
Companies themselves often recognize and tout greenhouse gas reductions,
ostensibly to benefit their business outcomes and bottom lines.233 If that is the case,
then the converse—that failing to disclose to avoid scrutiny will increase greenhouse
gas emissions—may also be true.
The constitutional standing doctrine supports the assumption that allowing
cases for statutory violations to proceed itself will encourage the avoidance of future
violations. Merely the risk of repeating a violation can confer standing, even if a
violation is not ongoing.234 In Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, the Fourth Circuit
found a case to be moot because the violation of a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit was wholly in the past.235 On appeal at the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the case was not moot.236 Justice Ginsburg,
writing for the 7-2 majority, opined that, for a party to establish that its voluntary
compliance renders a past violation moot, the party must make it “absolutely clear
the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”237 The
Court also held that civil penalties for “wholly past violations” could supply redress
for standing analysis by deterring similar future injuries if violations are
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“ongoing,”238 taking care to distinguish the redressability inquiry from mootness
analysis.239
With respect to attorneys working in government agencies, material
information that could affect a federal agency’s decision is required to be disclosed
and explained during APA notice and comment rulemaking.240 Information
regarding greenhouse gas emissions would, by definition, be material because of the
impacts of climate change, and could therefore affect the agency’s final substantive
rule language. For example, using an incorrect and misleading social cost of carbon
in an APA Section 553 rulemaking to support an agency’s record of decision will
result in an understatement of the impacts of greenhouse gases. Taking action to
promote a more accurate estimate should affect or change the agency’s decision,
which in turn should lead to fewer emissions and, consequently, lessen harm caused
by those emissions.
In the particular case of a government lawyer who has been asked to use
incorrect or false data to justify a new rule that will lead to an increase in greenhouse
gas emissions—especially of the magnitude that would be at stake under a broad
federal rule such as restrictions on coal-fired power plants—participating in such
work could facilitate a substantial contribution to climate change-related harms.
Rather than perpetrate a public fraud that could cause death or substantial bodily
harm, the attorney could withdraw and disclose her opinion about the legality of the
agency’s action.241 In turn, withdrawal and disclosure could “prevent” harm from
occurring.
Whether withdrawal and disclosure are required or merely permitted depends
on whether using unquestionably false materials in specific administrative activities,
such as an APA Section 553 rulemaking, would constitute a criminal or fraudulent
act under a particular state’s construction of this definition—regardless of the
characterization under federal law.242 The operation of Model Rules 1.2(d),
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1.16(a)(1), 1.6(b), and 4.1(b) could then take over. According to the ABA Model
Rule commentary:
Sometimes it may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of
withdrawal and to disaffirm an opinion, document, affirmation or the like.
In extreme cases, substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose
information relating to the representation to avoid being deemed to have
assisted the client’s crime or fraud. If the lawyer can avoid assisting a
client’s crime or fraud only by disclosing this information, then under
paragraph (b) the lawyer is required to do so, unless the disclosure is
prohibited by Rule 1.6.243
Therefore, by lessening future greenhouse gas emissions, attorney disclosure
and/or withdrawal would prevent at least some of the harm from occurring.
V. REPORTING ETHICAL VIOLATIONS COULD BE A VERY EFFECTIVE TOOL
TO TARGET GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
Unlike the process of bringing a court case, making an ethical violation claim
against an attorney is both easy in most states and incentivized by the ethical rules
themselves.
A. Ease of Reporting Against an Offending Attorney
1. Initial Reporting
“Each state has its own agency that performs [disciplinary investigations and
actions] in regard to lawyers practicing in that state.”244 The burden of filing a
complaint alleging a lawyer’s legal ethical violation is not high in most states, with
proponents typically having to show only a “belief” in misconduct.245
The process in Texas is illustrative and fairly typical of most states’ processes
of reporting and resolving ethics complaints against attorneys. According to the
Texas State Bar’s online portal, anyone who believes they have witnessed attorney
misconduct (clients, the public, judges, etc.) can file a grievance against a Texas
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attorney.246 To do this, a grievance form must be completed, including copies of all
supporting documents.247 The complaint is then reviewed by the Texas State Bar
Chief Disciplinary Counsel (CDC), which will determine whether the grievance, on
its face, alleges professional misconduct.248 This determination, referred to as
classification of the grievance, is made within 30 days of the grievance being filed.249
Next, if the alleged facts constitute a violation of the state’s attorney ethics rules, the
grievance will be classified as a formal “Complaint,” and the respondent attorney
will be informed and given 30 days from the date of receipt to respond.250
2. Just Cause Determination
According to the grievance description on the Texas Bar Association’s web
site:
Within 60 days of the response deadline, the CDC, through its
investigation,251 must determine whether there is Just Cause to believe that
professional misconduct occurred . . . If the [CDC] determines that there
is no Just Cause to proceed on the Complaint, the case is presented to a
Summary Disposition Panel, an independent decision maker with the
discretion to accept or reject the CDC’s determination. [The Panel is
comprised] of local grievance committee members composed of twothirds lawyers and one-third public members. All information and results
of the CDC’s investigation is presented to the panel at a docket hearing
without the presence of either the complainant or respondent. If the panel
accepts the CDC’s determination, the Complaint will be dismissed. If the
246
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panel rejects the CDC’s determination, the panel votes to proceed on the
Complaint.252
3. Referral to Trial
Once a complaint is determined to have possible merit, an attorney can
determine “to have the case heard before an evidentiary panel of the grievance
committee or by a district court, with or without a jury.”253 The tribunal then reaches
a decision of whether the attorney violated an ethical duty.254
B. Requirement of Attorney Disclosure of Other Attorney Ethical Violations
The model rules reflect the uniform requirement that an attorney who has
knowledge of an ethics violation by another attorney must report that to the
appropriate authorities, absent other requirements of confidentiality.255 While
historically, this requirement has been considered difficult to enforce,256 and
insufficiently utilized257 in the situation where one wants to report alleged
misconduct, there are few barriers to doing so. Texas explains the rule thusly: “[A]
lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of
applicable rules of professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall
inform the appropriate disciplinary authority.”258
Commentary to Texas Rule 8.3 makes it clear that when in doubt, an attorney
is expected to err on the side of protecting the public:
Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the
profession initiate disciplinary investigations when they have knowledge
not protected by Rule 1.05 that a violation of these rules has occurred . . .
Frequently, the existence of a violation cannot be established with
certainty until a disciplinary investigation has been undertaken. Similarly,
an apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that
only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. Consequently, a lawyer
should not fail to report an apparent disciplinary violation merely because
he cannot determine its existence or scope with absolute certainty.
252

Id.
Id.
254
Id.
255
Nikki Ott & Heather Newton, A Current Look at Model Rule 8.3: How It Is Used
and What Are Courts Doing About It?, 16 GEO. J. L. & ETHICS 747, 747 (2003) (citing
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002)).
256
Id. at 748.
257
Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from
Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 451, 451–52 (2007).
258
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.03 (2019).
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Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely
to discover the offense. 259
The procedural ease in filing ethics complaints, along with the requirement that
other attorneys disclose evidence of violations, demonstrates how the system could
be used to ultimately accomplish another goal.
In a recent article entitled The Ethics Resistance, Brian Sheppard has described
the increased use of attorney ethics complaints for political purposes in the Trump
era.260 These complaints are uncoupled from traditional complaints by clients or
other attorneys.261 While his article focuses mostly on the power of political claims
to shame public officials, imagine how many more private attorneys could be
susceptible to a motivated group of complainants.
This puts the attorney representing clients who contribute to greenhouse gas
emissions between a rock and a hard place. Since greenhouse gas emissions have
not yet been determined by a state bar association to cause substantial death or bodily
harm in a way that triggers the state equivalent of Model Rule 1.6(b)(1), an attorney
would worry that to disclose confidential information related to greenhouse gas
emissions would itself be a breach of client confidentiality duties. However, if the
harms caused by greenhouse gas emissions through concomitant climate change are
identified by a state’s attorney disciplinary decisionmaker as information about
death or substantial bodily harm that must be revealed, the attorney could be subject
to disciplinary action for failing to make disclosures related to their client’s
greenhouse gas emissions.
Attorneys could ask for state attorney general opinions, but these are not
binding and would themselves draw attention to client behavior. All of this together
may push risk-averse attorneys toward not entering or continuing in practice areas
where they would represent greenhouse gas emitters, thereby depriving these parties
of the legal representation necessary to navigate their businesses. This is exactly the
outcome that climate activists would like to see: depriving the attorney “oxygen”
from the greenhouse gas emissions “fire.”
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a multitude of entities that either emit major amounts of greenhouse
gases or facilitate the emission of greenhouse gases. The same greenhouse gases, in
turn, are causing an unprecedented and rapid change in the climate of the entire
Earth, resulting in massive impacts on all sectors of society, leading to over 100,000

259

TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.03 cmt 1 (2019) (emphasis added).
Sheppard, supra note 245, at 259.
261
Id. at 261.
260
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attributable deaths per year.262 And the impacts are only going to accelerate. 263 Every
state in the United States has promulgated attorney ethical laws that may require or
allow disclosure of otherwise confidential client activities if the activities could
cause imminent death or substantial bodily harm. As this Article has explained,
greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change could meet that standard of harm.
Faced with relative inaction and even hostility on the part of the United States
federal government in addressing the greenhouse gas emissions and the harms the
country causes, climate activists in the United States and around the world have gone
beyond legislative debates and are increasing their use of alternative methods to
change behavior and curb the harms caused by climate change. Climate activists are
using existing legal regimes—from common law to statutes not specifically
designed for greenhouse gas emissions—to curb climate change. These methods
have been directed at private corporations and governments.
Given that greenhouse gas emissions could trigger attorney ethical
responsibilities, it is only a matter of time before attorney ethics rules become
another legal tool that climate advocacy organizations use to try and lessen
continued greenhouse gas emissions. Practicing attorneys have a duty to stay abreast
of relevant ethical rules and their application to the ever-evolving practice of law.
The climate activism emerging now, coupled with the recent judicial recognition of
the harms caused by climate change and their connection to greenhouse gases,
suggests caution. Therefore, attorneys should be aware of this possibility and react
accordingly. Whether in the employ of a large multinational firm or the government,
ethical obligations exist. This Article reveals the possible coming vulnerability of
attorneys for failing to disclose the dangers of client activity related to climate
change.

262

See discussion supra Part III.
See WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION, THE GLOBAL CLIMATE IN 2015–
2019, at 3 (2019), https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=9936 [https://perma.cc
/C8CR-FLQL] (describing “[c]ontinuing and accelerating trends” in major greenhouse gas
emissions, global temperature increases and “other key climate indicators.”).
263
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Appendix A: State versions of ABA Model Ethics Rule 1.6(b) regarding disclosure
of confidential client information in face of death or substantial bodily harm
State that Requires Disclosure if Attorney Would be Assisting a Criminal
or Fraudulent Act
Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal confidential information relating to the
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary, and to the extent required by Rules 3.3, 4.1(b),
8.1 or 8.3 must reveal, such information:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm, or to prevent the wrongful execution or incarceration of
another . . . . 264
Rule 4.1(b):
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
...
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by
Rule 1.6.265
The 12 States that Require Disclosure
Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, ER 1.6(b):
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information [relating to the
representation of a client] to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal
act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial
bodily harm.266

264

MASS.
RULES
OF
PROF’L
CONDUCT
r.
1.6(b)(1)
(2020),
https://www.mass.gov/supreme-judicial-court-rules/rules-of-professional-conduct-rule-16confidentiality-of-information [https://perma.cc/P9V9-2QLU].
265
MASS RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1(b) (2020), https://www.mass.gov/supremejudicial-court-rules/rules-of-professional-conduct-rule-41-truthfulness-in-statements-to
[https://perma.cc/8FLG-9ER9]. In other words, Massachusetts Rule 1.6(b)(1) and 4.1(b)
should be read together to require that if an attorney is considered to be assisting in a criminal
or fraudulent act relating to the GHG emissions, then the attorney must disclose.
266
ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT ER 1.6(b) (2019), http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/
RulesofProfessionalConduct/ViewRule?id=26 [https://perma.cc/LB8M-EZ6N].
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Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b):
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information [relating to the
representation of a client] to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal
or fraudulent act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death
or substantial bodily harm.267
Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4-1.6(b)(2):
(b) A lawyer must reveal confidential information to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent a client from committing a crime; or
(2) to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm to another.268
Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(c):
(c) A lawyer shall reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.269
New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information to the proper authorities,
as soon as, and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary, to prevent the client or another person:
(1) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the
lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or
substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of another . . . .270

267

CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (2020), https://www.jud.ct.gov/Publicat
ions/PracticeBook/PB.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM7Q-YM38].
268
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6(b)(2) (2019), https://www-media.floridabar.org/up
loads/2019/09/Ch-4-from-2020_03-SEP-RRTFB-9-19-19-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/25HGKSDP].
269
ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.6(c) (2010), http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/Supre
meCourt/Rules/Art_VIII/ArtVIII_NEW.htm#1.6 [https://perma.cc/UYP5-ZRRK].
270
N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2019), https://www.njcourts.gov/attor
neys/assets/rules/rpc.pdf [https://perma.cc/2J84-U4EJ].
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North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b):
(b) A lawyer is required to reveal information relating to the
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer believes
reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm.271
Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(c)(1):
(c) A lawyer shall reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes disclosure is
necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm . . . .272
Texas Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.05(e):
(e) When a lawyer has confidential information clearly establishing
that a client is likely to commit a criminal or fraudulent act that is
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm to a person, the
lawyer shall reveal confidential information to the extent revelation
reasonably appears necessary to prevent the client from committing
the criminal or fraudulent act.273
Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer must reveal information relating to the representation
of a client when required by other provisions of these rules or to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client or another person from committing a
criminal act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to
result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, a person
other than the person committing the act . . . .274
271

N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (2016), https://www.ndcourts.gov/legalresources/rules/ndrprofconduct/1-6 [https://perma.cc/U5EL-K8JN].
272
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 8, RPC 1.6(c)(1) (2017), http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/rules/supreme
-court/8 [https://perma.cc/Y9UX-QRFH].
273
TEX.
RULES
OF
PROF’L
CONDUCT
r.
1.05(e)
(1995),
https://www.legalethicstexas.com/Ethics-Resources/Rules/Texas-Disciplinary-Rules-ofProfessional-Conduct/I--CLIENT-LAWYER-RELATIONSHIP/1-05-Confidentiality-ofInformation [https://perma.cc/MG2Z-FMDN].
274
VT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2009), https://www.vermontjudiciary.
org/sites/default/files/documents/VermontRulesofProfessionalConduct.pdf [https://perma.
cc/Z5NY-Z3SF].
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Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(c)(1):
(c) A lawyer shall promptly reveal:
(1) the intention of a client, as stated by the client, to commit a
crime reasonably certain to result in death or substantial bodily
harm to another or substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another and the information necessary to prevent
the crime, but before revealing such information, the attorney
shall, where feasible, advise the client of the possible legal
consequences of the action, urge the client not to commit the
crime, and advise the client that the attorney must reveal the
client’s criminal intention unless thereupon abandoned.
However, if the crime involves perjury by the client, the
attorney shall take appropriate remedial measures as required
by Rule 3.3 . . . .275
Washington Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) shall reveal information relating to the representation of a
client to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm . . . .276
Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b):
(b) A lawyer shall reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to
prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that
the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or
substantial bodily harm or in substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of another.277

275
VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(c)(1) (2020), http://www.vsb.org/proguidelines/index.php/main/print_view [https://perma.cc/V2NS-29SP].
276
WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2019), https://www.courts.wa.gov/
court_rules/ [https://perma.cc/47S6-8LT2].
277
WIS. S. CT. R. 20:1.6(b) (2017), https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/scr/20
[https://perma.cc/4RYA-XKUY].
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The 37 States that Permit Disclosure
Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information [relating to the
representation of a client] to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) To prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm . . . . 278
Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1)(A)-(B):
(b) A lawyer may reveal a client’s confidence or secret to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain
(A) death [or]
(B) substantial bodily harm . . . . 279
Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information [relating to the
representation of a client] to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the commission of a criminal act;
....
[Comment 6] Although the public interest is usually best served by
a strict rule requiring lawyers to preserve the confidentiality of
information relating to the representation of their clients, the
confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions. For instance, in
becoming privy to information about a client, a lawyer may foresee
that the client or a third person intends to commit a crime and may
reveal that information to prevent the crime. The overriding value
of life and physical integrity permits disclosure reasonably
necessary to prevent death or bodily harm. Other future harms as a
result of a criminal act, such as fraud, damage to economic interests,
or loss of property which are reasonably certain to occur, also permit
disclosure if necessary to eliminate the threat.280

278
ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2019), http://judicial.alabama.gov/
docs/library/rules/cond1_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP3M-P6EB].
279
ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2009),
https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/rules/docs/prof.pdf [https://perma.cc/SDJ7-3V8Y].
280
Id. r. 1.6 cmt 6.
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California Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3-100(B):
(B) A member may, but is not required to, reveal confidential
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent
that the member reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to
prevent a criminal act that the member reasonably believes is likely
to result in death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.281
Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm . . . .282
Delaware Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm . . . .283
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.6(b)(1)(ii)
“A lawyer may reveal information [gained in the professional
relationship with a client] which the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary:
(i) to avoid or prevent harm or substantial financial loss to
another as a result of client criminal conduct or third party
criminal conduct clearly in violation of the law;
(ii) to prevent serious injury or death not otherwise covered by
subparagraph (i) above . . . .284

281

CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3-100(B) (2018), https://www.calbar.ca.gov/
Attorneys/Conduct-Discipline/Rules/Rules-of-Professional-Conduct/Current-Rules/Rule-3100 [https://perma.cc/8PWA-V2DB].
282
COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2018), https://www.cobar.org/ForMembers/Opinions-Rules-Statutes/Rules-of-Professional-Conduct/Rule-16-Confidentiality
-of-Information [https://perma.cc/8CCZ-MYSQ].
283
DEL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2020), https://courts.delaware.gov/
rules/pdf/2020DelawareLawyersRulesProfessionalConduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9KHQU9A].
284
GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(i)–(ii) (2017), https://www.gabar.org/
Handbook/index.cfm#handbook/rule57 [https://perma.cc/2TJJ-DPJX].
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Hawaii Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal or
fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to
result in death or substantial bodily harm, or in substantial injury
to the financial interests or property of another . . . .285
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(2):
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
....
(2) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm . . . . 286
Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm . . . .287
Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 32:1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm . . . .288

285

HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2014), https://www.courts.state.hi.
us/docs/court_rules/rules/hrpcond.htm#Rule%201.6 [https://perma.cc/99LU-5NCQ].
286
IDAHO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2) (2014), https://isb.idaho.gov/wpcontent/uploads/irpc.pdf [https://perma.cc/93GX-GM4A].
287
IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2019), https://www.in.gov/judiciary
/rules/prof_conduct/#_Toc461714661 [https://perma.cc/RP8M-P3BP].
288
IOWA S. CT. R. 32:1.6(b)(1) (2012), https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/ACO/Court
RulesChapter/12-31-2012.32.pdf [https://perma.cc/B467-NHJF].
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Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1), (4):
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information [relating to representation
of a client] to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a crime . . . .289
Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm . . . .290
Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm . . . .291
Maine Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal a confidence or secret of a client to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain substantial bodily harm or
death . . . .292
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) An attorney may reveal information relating to the
representation of a client to the extent the attorney reasonably
believes necessary:

289

KAN. S. CT. R. 226, KAN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2019),
https://www.kscourts.org/Rules-Orders/Rules/1-6-Client-Lawyer-Relationship-Confident
iality-of [https://perma.cc/DE5Q-7Z2L].
290
KY. S. CT. R. 3.130(1.6)(b)(1) (2018), https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.kybar.org/re
source/resmgr/SCR3/SCR_3.130_(1.6).pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZG9-J79M].
291
LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2015), https://lalegalethics.org/louis
iana-rules-of-professional-conduct/article-1-client-lawyer-relationship/rule-1-6-confident
iality-of-information/ [https://perma.cc/N6SX-UFBE].
292
ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2015), https://mebaroverseers.org/
regulation/bar_rules.html?id=88169 [https://perma.cc/2P3B-6EQL].
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(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm . . . .293
Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(c)(4):
(c) A lawyer may reveal:
....
(4) the intention of a client to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime . . . .294
....
Comment: If the prospective crime is likely to result in substantial
injury, the lawyer may feel a moral obligation to take preventive
action. When the threatened injury is grave, such as homicide or
serious bodily injury, a lawyer may have an obligation under tort or
criminal law to take reasonable preventive measures. Whether the
lawyer’s concern is based on moral or legal considerations, the
interest in preventing the harm may be more compelling than the
interest in preserving confidentiality of information relating to the
client. . . .295
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, 1.6(b)(6):
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client if:
....
(6) the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary
to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm
. . . .296

293

MD. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
19-301.6(b)(1)
(2016),
https://govt.westlaw.com/mdc/Document/N43E45F203C0211E69A7981745F9F9D8A?vie
wType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageItem&c
ontextData=(sc.Default)&bhcp=1#co_anchor_I80871D10B4CB11E9A0A0D939A11C1D9
F [https://perma.cc/2RA7-ZA7A].
294
MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(c)(4) (2020), https://courts.michigan.gov/
Courts/MichiganSupremeCourt/rules/Documents/Michigan%20Rules%20of%20Profession
al%20Conduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T6H-RNK7].
295
Id. r. 1.6 cmt.
296
MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(6) (2019), https://www.revisor.mn.gov
/court_rules/pr/subtype/cond/id/1.6/ [https://perma.cc/A9SX-KBAP].
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Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm . . . .297
Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent death or substantial bodily harm that is reasonably
certain to occur . . . .298
Montana Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm . . . .299
Nebraska Rules of Professional Conduct § 3-501.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a crime or to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm . . . .300

297

MISS.
RULES
OF
PROF’L
CONDUCT
r.
1.6(b)(1)
(2019),
https://courts.ms.gov/research/rules/msrulesofcourt/rules_of_professional_conduct.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CNA2-DXQQ].
298
MO. S. CT. R. 4-1.6(b)(1) (2019), https://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/ClerkHandbo
oksP2RulesOnly.nsf/c0c6ffa99df4993f86256ba50057dcb8/b284eee6f79f447486256ca6005
211ee?OpenDocument [Perma.cc link unavailable].
299
MONT.
RULES
OF
PROF’L
CONDUCT
r.
1.6(b)(1)
(2020),
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.montanabar.org/resource/resmgr/attorney_rules_and_regulati
ons/rules_of_prof_conduct.pdf [https://perma.cc/A28H-S57X].
300
NEB. CT. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 3-501.6(b)(1) (2019),
https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/supreme-court-rules/chapter-3-attorneys-and-practicelaw/article-5-nebraska-rules-professional-10 [https://perma.cc/P86E-H2XC].
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Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) To prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm . . . .301
New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information [relating to the
representation of a client] to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm or to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that
the lawyer believes is likely to result in substantial injury to the
financial interest or property of another . . . .302
New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 16-106(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm . . . .303
New York Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1):
(b) A lawyer may reveal or use confidential information to the extent
that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm . . . .304

301

NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2019), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/
courtrules/RPC.html [https://perma.cc/E5BN-5X53].
302
N.H. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2020), https://www.courts.state.nh.us/
rules/pcon/pcon-1_6.htm [https://perma.cc/ZA7C-RGWW].
303
N.M. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 16-106(b)(1) (2018), https://laws.nmonesource.
com/w/nmos/Rule-Set-16-NMRA#!fragment/zoupio-_Toc32398969/BQCwhgziBcwMYg
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